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Although Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are ethnically and culturally 
similar, and all relied on neutrality to protect their sovereignty prior to the Second World 
War, Denmark and Norway sought protection from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) after the war while Finland and Sweden still remain outside the 
Alliance. This thesis explores the reasons for these diverging paths before discussing 
what might cause Finland and Sweden to join NATO in the future. The thesis finds that 
recent Russian aggression has pushed Finland and Sweden closer than ever to seeking 
membership, and concludes that they will probably join the Alliance eventually, but only 
after their general elections in 2019 and 2018, respectively, at the earliest. Additionally, 
the thesis notes that Finland is a stronger proponent for non-alignment, while Sweden is 
increasingly pushing the duo toward NATO membership. Furthermore, the research 
indicates that the NATO Allies would welcome these two countries into the Alliance if 
they sought membership. U.S. foreign policy might most effectively encourage Finnish 
and Swedish membership by avoiding bilateral security guarantees with them, supporting 
fact-based public debates in the countries, and engaging with their governments.  
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This thesis identifies factors that have influenced states to join the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) or abstain from seeking membership in the Alliance, 
examining the Nordic states of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as case studies. 
Although these countries are ethnically and culturally similar, they have made different 
foreign policy decisions regarding neutrality and NATO, and this thesis investigates why 
they have done so.  
This thesis is timely because recent Russian aggression under President Vladimir 
Putin has encouraged widespread questioning of the value of neutrality in both Finland 
and Sweden. Helsinki and Stockholm have increased their bilateral military cooperation 
as well as their partnership activities with NATO. After analyzing key historical factors 
in each case study, the thesis identifies current factors that might lead Finland and 
Sweden to follow in the footsteps of their Nordic neighbors and join NATO. The primary 
questions the thesis addresses are: Why did Denmark and Norway join NATO while 
Finland and Sweden did not, and what developments might lead Finland and Sweden to 
join the Alliance in the future? 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the emergence of Russia as a revisionist power that is pursuing aggressive 
foreign policies, understanding why Finland and Sweden have yet to join NATO and 
what might lead them to reverse their decisions in this regard is of critical importance. 
From a strategic standpoint, Finland and Sweden would be vital in any NATO defense of 
the Baltic states if Moscow decided to attack them, especially given the Anti-Access/
Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy that the Russians would probably employ at Kaliningrad 
and elsewhere. Under current circumstances, such a strategy might prevent NATO 
reinforcements from effectively reaching the Baltic states, but operations involving 
Finnish and Swedish forces, territory, and territorial waters might enable NATO to 
defend the Baltic states.  
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Furthermore, the geopolitical and strategic shift that Finland or Sweden (or both) 
joining NATO would represent would be enormous—as significant as their decisions to 
remain neutral since the late 1940s have been. Choosing to join NATO would probably 
affect their political and strategic positioning for a long time to come, and would not be 
just an incremental step in their increasingly active partnerships with NATO.1 It would 
mean an Article 5 collective defense commitment with the other Allies.2 Additionally, if 
Finland joined the Alliance, Russia’s border with NATO countries would double in size, 
further restricting Russian influence in the Nordic region, increasing Western influence in 
it, and adding a front to any war Russia might initiate against NATO.3 Such a move 
would also signal a defeat for Russian foreign policy, as the Russians have strongly 
opposed any further NATO enlargement. 
Lastly, although it is not the primary aim of this thesis, the thesis will also 
contribute to the broader theoretical discussions regarding why countries join alliances or 
choose not to join them, and whether and why Finland and Sweden might join NATO in 
particular. This topic is broad, multi-disciplinary, and extremely important, because the 
associated questions have significant policy implications and affect international relations 
on a continuing basis.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although individual histories have been written about Danish, Finnish, 
Norwegian, and Swedish foreign policies as they relate to the Cold War period, a 
comparative study examining why two of these Nordic countries were founding members 
of NATO and two others have remained outside the Alliance has never been published. 
Furthermore, few works have been published in English that directly address why 
Finland and Sweden did not join the Alliance as founding members, and the studies that 
mention the question often simply say that they decided to remain neutral without 
                                                 
1 Mats Bergquist et al., “The Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership,” The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Finland, April 2016, http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=345685, 57. 
2 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 21, 2016, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. 
3 Bergquist et al., “The Effects,” 47. 
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exploring or explaining the factors that led to these decisions. Consequently, there is 
much to be studied in this area. 
Many works of scholarship, however, have investigated why Finland and Sweden 
have not joined NATO in the post–Cold War era, and why they should or should not join. 
Some analyses have considered the likelihood of either state joining, and what might 
cause them to do so. Few of these studies have analyzed these questions with an eye 
toward history, however; and this will be the unique perspective of this thesis.  
The most popular explanation for Denmark’s decision to join NATO is that the 
Danish experience during the Second World War caused Danes to lose faith in their 
traditional policy of neutrality, and that an increasingly volatile Cold War led them to 
seek cover under the protective umbrella of the United States.4 The main arguments 
behind this line of thinking are that after the war the Danes had an almost non-existent 
military, were positioned on the front line of any future East-West conflict, and had only 
recently regained their sovereignty. The combination of these factors caused the Danes to 
feel extremely vulnerable in facing an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union, and led 
them into the Alliance. 
A second explanation offered for Denmark’s decision is that the United States 
strongly desired Denmark’s participation in the Alliance, especially due to its possession 
of Greenland, and consequently intervened in the Swedish-led talks regarding the 
possible formation of a Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU).5 Such a union would have 
linked Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in a military alliance that would not necessarily 
have involved the major Western powers. According to some accounts, the United States 
wished to prevent such an alliance from forming, so Washington informed the Nordic 
countries that a neutral SDU could not count on an ability to purchase American military 
                                                 
4 See Juhana Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War, 1945–1954: Understanding Neutrality 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign 
Policy Since the Second World War (London: Hugh Evelyn Limited, 1968); Johan Stenfeldt, “Positioning 
in the Cold War: Swedish and Danish History Textbooks and the Totalitarianism Doctrine: Historical 
Cultures in Comparison,” Scandinavian Journal of History 37, no. 4 (2012) 505–525; Mikael Nilsson, 
“Amber Nine: NATO’s Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in 
NATO’s Infrastructure,” Journal of Contemporary History 44, no.2 (2009), doi: 1 0.1 177/
0022009408101252. 
5 See Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War; Nilsson, “Amber Nine.”  
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supplies.6 This move, some observers hold, brought an end to the potential Scandinavian 
alliance and left Denmark and Norway little choice but to either join NATO or pursue a 
neutral course on the model of Finland or Sweden.7 
An opposing narrative argues that the SDU talks fell apart not because of external 
pressure, but due to disagreements between Norway and Sweden.8 While Norway was 
unwilling to accept an SDU that was not linked to Western (and specifically American) 
support, Sweden was just as determined that the SDU should be neutral in the broader 
East-West struggle. Scholars disagree on Denmark’s orientation concerning the SDU, but 
generally agree that it ultimately did not matter because Norway’s and Sweden’s inability 
to reach an accord caused the talks to collapse. Consequently, Denmark was left to decide 
between NATO and a neutrality it no longer trusted, making the decision easy. 
A final reported element in Denmark’s decision to join NATO is that it was 
essentially a given that Denmark wanted to join the Alliance, given its security concerns 
outlined earlier, but that an internal debate within the British government ultimately 
resulted in the invitation to Denmark to join the Alliance.9 Some observers maintain, 
however, that the assumption that Britain wanted Denmark and Norway in the Alliance is 
incorrect, since there was much internal debate over the issue.10 On the other hand, this 
interpretation of events seems to assume that Denmark and Norway wanted to join the 
Alliance if invited. Thus, it was primarily Britain’s decision to support their inclusion that 
led Denmark and Norway to join the Alliance as founding members. 
The published explanations for Norway’s decision to join NATO are the same as 
those for Denmark, with the exception of the most widely accepted argument: Norway 
                                                 
6 Nilsson, “Amber Nine,” 289. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Thorsten B. Olesen, “The Dilemmas of Interdependence: Danish Foreign Policy 1945–1972,” 
Journal of European Integration History 7, no. 2 (2001), 37–63; Thorsten B. Olesen, “Scandinavian 
Security Alignments 1948–1949 in the DBPO Mirror,” Scandinavian Journal of History 37, no. 2 (2012), 
185–197. 
9 See Martin H. Folly, “Protecting the Northern Flank, or Keeping the Cold War out of Scandinavia?: 
British Planning and the Place of Norway and Denmark in a North Atlantic Pact, 1947–9,” The 
International History Review 34, no. 1, 45–69, doi: 10.1080/07075332.2012.620239.  
10 Ibid., 46–47.  
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received warnings from three sources in March 1948 that the Soviets were going to try to 
force Oslo to sign a non-aggression pact, and this led Norwegians to support the creation 
of a Western alliance, which they joined upon its founding barely a year later.11 This 
interpretation paints the simple picture that one action, the rumored impending Soviet 
pressure for a pact with Norway, led to the creation of NATO with Norway as a founding 
member. 
The arguments for why Finland did not join NATO are more generally agreed 
upon than the arguments outlined for why Denmark and Norway did join the Alliance. 
The literature that addresses this question for Finland varies primarily in emphasis, and 
this is largely determined by the analytical perspective chosen by the authors. Three 
perspectives stand out: that of the Finns, that of the Western powers, and that of outside 
observers.  
Scholars arguing from the Finnish perspective emphasize that Finland did not join 
NATO because the Finns believed that their best hope for maintaining independence was 
to form a positive relationship with the Soviet Union aimed at a non-threatening, peaceful 
co-existence. The primary rationale behind this reasoning is typically that Finland lost 
trust in the leading Western powers when they did not assist Helsinki in the Winter War 
or in negotiating beneficial terms in the Treaty of Paris. Consequently, after the Second 
World War, Finland found itself without reliable security partners, forcibly demilitarized 
by the Soviet Union, and thus unable to defend against any Soviet attack. Finland’s only 
hope of surviving with a degree of political independence, then, was to placate the 
Soviets and hope for the best.12 
                                                 
11 Folly, “Protecting the Northern Flank,” 50. For more on those who argued this point, see Hastings 
Lionel Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years (Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1955); Don Cook, 
Forging the Alliance: NATO 1945 to 1950 (London: Arbor House, 1989), 125; Olav Riste, “Was 1949 a 
Turning Point? Norway and the Western Powers 1947–1950,” in Western Security: the Formative Years. 
European and Atlantic Defence 1947–1953, ed. Olav Riste (Oslo: Norwegian University Press,1985), 139; 
Tony Insall and Patrick Salmon, “Preface to the Nordic Countries: From War to Cold War, 1944–1951,” 
Scandinavian Journal of History 37, no. 2 (2012): 136–155, doi: 10.1080/03468755.2012.666643. 
12 See Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War; Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality; Klaus Törnudd, 
“Finnish Neutrality Policy during the Cold War,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 2 
(Summer 2005), 43–52; Tuomo Polvinen, D.G. Kirby and Peter Herring (ed. and trans.), Between East and 
West, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 
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From the Western perspective, on the other hand, scholars have emphasized that 
Finland was never given a chance to join NATO, since Western politicians and strategists 
had written Finland off as lost to the Soviets after the Finns signed the Finnish-Soviet 
Treaty of 1948. Since Finland never received an invitation, it could not have joined 
NATO regardless of any other factors.13  
Lastly, analyses performed by neutral observers have led some scholars to simply 
say that Finland could not join a Western alliance because the Soviets would not allow it. 
Finland was still paying Moscow heavy war reparations, and until 1956 Finland hosted a 
Soviet military base at the port of Porkkala, a mere 10 miles from Helsinki.14 
Furthermore, the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 1948, signed a year before NATO was formed, 
contained text that would have prevented Finland from joining the Alliance from a legal 
perspective.15 
The arguments for why Sweden remained non-aligned and did not join NATO are 
perhaps more varied than those for any of the other countries under consideration in this 
thesis. These arguments include the suggestion that Sweden was not actually neutral at 
all, but rather acted like an unofficial member of the Alliance, the thesis that Sweden was 
acting in accordance with the theory of a “Nordic Balance,” the assertion that Swedish 
leaders maintained a policy of non-alignment due to domestic political concerns or 
because of its historical success in protecting Sweden, and the proposition that Sweden’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs during the creation of NATO, Östen Undén, would simply 
not budge from a policy of non-alignment. 
The argument that Sweden was not truly neutral during the Cold War stems from 
a variety of secret moves that Swedish politicians and military officials made either to 
benefit NATO or to prepare to fight a war on its side. This cooperation with the West has 
led many scholars to argue that Sweden’s policy of non-alignment in peace aimed at 
                                                 
13 See Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War. 
14 Törnudd, “Finnish Neutrality Policy,” 43. 
15 An analysis of the treaty’s impact may be found in Törnudd, “Finnish Neutrality Policy.” 
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neutrality in war “should be viewed as illusional, if not outright fraudulent.”16 An 
analysis of this argument is provided by Ulf Bjereld and Ann-Marie Ekengren in their 
study “Cold War Historiography in Sweden.”17 
The “Nordic Balance” theory argues that the Nordic countries were able to work 
together as a unit, at times knowingly and at other times passively, to balance the Eastern 
and Western powers’ influences in the region during the Cold War. With Denmark and 
Norway in NATO, and Finland under the thumb of the Soviet Union, the theory 
maintains that Sweden served as a crucial moderator between the two sides.18 Danish and 
Norwegian politicians used this argument to justify their refusal to allow NATO bases on 
their soil in peacetime, since doing so, they argued, would lead the Soviet Union to 
increase its influence in Finland.19 Similarly, Swedish politicians argued that if Sweden 
joined NATO then Finland would become a satellite state of the Soviet Union.20 Scholars 
such as Krister Wahlback have taken these Swedish politicians at their word and have 
argued that this rationale led the majority of Swedes, both in and out of the government, 
to argue against joining NATO in order to protect Finnish independence.21 Others, such 
as Finnish Cold War diplomat and author Max Jakobson, have argued against this idea, 
saying that it makes as much sense as declaring that “Finland fought to retain her 
independence in order to make it easier for Sweden to stay neutral.”22 
The common argument that Sweden did not join NATO because of domestic 
political reasons contains many sub-arguments. Some scholars have maintained that 
                                                 
16 Ulf Bjereld and Ann-Marie Ekengren, “Cold War Historiography in Sweden,” in The Cold War and 
the Nordic Countries: Historiography at a Crossroads, ed. Thorsten B. Olesen (Odense: University Press 
of Southern Denmark, 2004), 143. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 154.  
19 See Robert Dalsjö, “The Hidden Rationality of Sweden’s Policy of Neutrality during the Cold 
War,” Cold War History 14, no. 2 (2014): 177, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
14682745.2013.765865. 
20 Dalsjö, “The Hidden Rationality,” 177; Olesen, “Scandinavian Security Alignments,” 190. 
21 Krister Wahlback, “Nordic Solidarity—a Problematic Affair,” in Friends in Need: Towards a 
Swedish Strategy of Solidarity with her Neighbours, ed. Bo Hugemark, (Stockholm: Royal Swedish 
Academy of War Sciences, 2012), 47–48. 
22 Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, 91. 
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Sweden’s long tradition of non-alignment led to it being the only policy that politicians 
could agree on.23 Others have claimed that most Swedes simply believed that continuing 
their policy of non-alignment would keep them out of any East-West war, just as it had 
kept them out of the Second World War.24 Lastly, Robert Dalsjö argues that the Swedes 
understood that they would be forced by circumstances into fighting alongside the NATO 
aligned countries in any war with the Soviet Union, but they remained non-aligned in 
peace because they wished to remain out of any nuclear exchange between the two sides 
and trusted that their traditional policy of neutrality could accomplish this.25 
Finally, Aunesluoma points out that the British, after many failures to persuade 
Sweden to join NATO as a founding member, concluded that Swedish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Östen Undén was the key to Stockholm’s refusal to shift away from a 
policy of non-alignment. Undén reportedly believed that if Sweden aligned with the West 
then the Soviets would see Sweden as a threat, which “would be disastrous.”26 
Consequently, the British Foreign Office concluded that “as long as Undén was in 
charge, fundamental changes in Swedish foreign policy would be highly unlikely.”27 
The existing works that address the question of what might cause Finland and 
Sweden to join NATO are varied in their conclusions. Ann-Sophie Dahl argues that 
Sweden will only join NATO if Finland joins and forces Stockholm’s hand, since many 
Swedes believe neutrality has always served them well.28 Jannicke Fiskvik, however, 
argues that both Finland and Sweden might join NATO if Russia moves aggressively 
towards the Baltic states.29 Andrew Wolff is even more optimistic about the countries’ 
chances of joining NATO, saying that it may happen if NATO leaders engage the Finnish 
                                                 
23 Dalsjö, “The Hidden Rationality,” 176–7. 
24 See Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War, 154; Olesen, “Scandinavian Security 
Alignments,” 187; Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, 91. 
25 Dalsjö, “The Hidden Rationality.” 
26 Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War, 54. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ann-Sophie Dahl, “Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral Superpower?,” 
International Journal 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 895–908. 
29 Jannicke Fiskvik, “Nordic Security: Moving towards NATO?,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 
no. 189 (April 2016): 4. 
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and Swedish governments and peoples in a debate on the issue.30 Regardless of the 
different reasons scholars give for why Finland and Sweden might join the Alliance, there 
is a general consensus that such an enlargement of NATO is not a foregone conclusion 
and may never happen. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The most persuasive answer to the primary research question of why Denmark 
and Norway chose to be founding members of NATO while Finland and Sweden did not 
is that Denmark and Norway were invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany and lost their 
sovereignty during the Second World War, but Finland and Sweden did not suffer 
equivalent losses. This negative history in Denmark and Norway might have played a 
crucial role in the national political debates that tipped them over the edge and on to the 
side of NATO. Sweden, on the other hand, avoided an attack of any kind during the war, 
and was potentially more comfortable in maintaining its policy of nonalignment in peace 
after the war as a consequence. Finland successfully defended its independence during 
the war, which may have given the Finns a certain confidence in their policy of 
nonalignment. 
A second hypothesis is that the geographic positions of Denmark and Norway led 
them more easily to joining the Western-oriented Alliance than did the locations of 
Finland and Sweden. The fact that Denmark and Norway are physically closer to the 
majority of the other NATO countries perhaps made it more practical for them to join 
than Finland and Sweden. Furthermore, Denmark did not share a border with any Soviet-
bloc countries when NATO was founded in 1949, and Norway had only a small border 
with the Soviet Union in the far north, while Sweden’s eastern border was exposed to the 
Baltic Sea and nearly all of Finland’s eastern perimeter was adjacent to the Soviet Union 
by both land and sea. Although this judgment may be counterintuitive, perhaps the 
relative safety afforded by Denmark’s and Norway’s geographic positions made them 
feel secure enough from Soviet reprisals to join NATO, while the exposed positions of 
                                                 
30 Andrew T. Wolff, “The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis,” International 
Affairs 91, no. 5 (2015): 1117. 
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Finland and Sweden discouraged them from joining a new Western Alliance that they 
were not sure would protect them. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research for this thesis is qualitative and involves a comparison of the four 
chosen case studies of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. This methodology is 
most appropriate to answer the broader research question that asks why countries make 
their alliance decisions because it supports an analysis of four culturally similar 
neighboring countries that made dramatically different alliance decisions when faced 
with the emerging bipolar world in the aftermath of the Second World War. Although 
Iceland is also a Nordic country, the decision to exclude it from the research permits a 
symmetrical study of two Nordic countries that joined NATO—Denmark and Norway—
and two that did not—Finland and Sweden.  
The research for this thesis includes both primary and secondary sources in 
English. Because of this language constraint, the majority of the analytical sources 
consulted are secondary. Government statements, translated into English if necessary, 
provide the main primary sources. Additionally, the research aimed at analyzing the 
question of what might cause Finland and Sweden to join NATO draws from historical 
lessons learned regarding the initial policy decisions when NATO was founded, but it is 
otherwise primarily based on sources written since November 2013, the beginning of the 
ongoing Ukraine crisis, since this crisis has had a dramatic impact on thinking on the 
issue in the Nordic region. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The organization of the thesis is straightforward. Chapter II analyzes why 
Denmark and Norway joined NATO as founding members, while Chapter III considers 
why Finland and Sweden did not. Chapter IV examines what might cause Finland and 
Sweden to join the Alliance in the future, and Chapter V examines whether the Alliance 
would accept Finnish or Swedish requests to join. The final chapter summarizes the main 
findings, offers an overall comparative analysis, and presents recommendations for U.S. 
national security policy concerning the countries and issues involved. 
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II. DENMARK AND NORWAY: CHOOSING NATO 
After the Second World War ended, a new international political structure 
emerged, eventually pitting NATO, founded in 1949, against the Warsaw Pact, 
established by the Soviet Union in 1955. Nearly all of Europe was forced to choose sides 
as the Cold War began, and the Nordic neighbors Denmark and Norway were no 
exception. Both countries had been occupied by Germany for more than five years during 
the war and faced severe post-war challenges such as reconstructing their economies and 
societies. Additionally, both countries had territory that had been occupied by the Soviet 
Union as the war ended, and it was becoming clear in the aftermath that Moscow had no 
intention of vacating its influence from the region in the foreseeable future.31  
Faced with these challenges, both Denmark and Norway elected to abandon their 
strong traditions of neutrality in favor of joining NATO as founding members. This 
chapter analyzes the reasons behind these alliance decisions. Ultimately, post-war politics 
in both Denmark and Norway did not allow these governments to remain non-aligned, 
since neutrality had failed them so clearly during the war and they did not have the 
capacities to defend themselves against any future Soviet aggression, which itself seemed 
increasingly likely after events such as the Prague coup in 1948. Additionally, 
negotiations for the SDU failed, which left Denmark and Norway with only one viable 
option for realistic territorial defense: to join NATO. The individual and unique situations 
in Denmark and Norway are examined prior to an analysis of the failed SDU negotiations 
that represented the best chance for the Danes and the Norwegians to pursue a path other 
than membership in NATO.  
A. DENMARK 
Prior to the Second World War, the Danes had for almost 200 years relied 
primarily on non-alignment in peace and neutrality in war in order to protect their 
sovereignty. This policy continued beyond the opening shots of the Second World War, 
as Denmark signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, only to be invaded by 
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the Nazis in April 1940. Denmark surrendered after only a couple hours of fighting—a 
pitiful combat performance that Danes would not soon forget.32 Although the Germans 
initially gave the Danes the fiction that they were merely a protectorate and that their 
neutrality had not entirely failed, even this veil was removed in 1943 when Germans took 
greater control of the puppet government.33 It was clear in the end that neutrality had 
utterly failed to protect Danish sovereignty and independence. After the Germans were 
defeated, Soviet forces took control of parts of Denmark in 1945, including the Baltic 
island of Bornholm. Since the Danes had little leverage with which to negotiate an end to 
this Soviet occupation, they were largely reduced to pleading and hoping that the Soviets 
would leave, which they eventually did in the spring of 1946.34 This experience—being 
easily conquered, subjected to foreign occupation, and left powerlessly to the whims of 
foreign governments—had a lasting effect on the Danish psyche and, consequently, 
national politics. Not least of those affected by this experience were the Social 
Democrats, including future Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft, who would lead the Danes to 
NATO membership in 1949.35 Indeed, Hedtoft’s argument to join NATO drew heavily 
on rhetoric involving Denmark being invaded during the war, though, as will be 
demonstrated, many other factors played a role as well.36 
After the war ended, the Danes found themselves in a rather precarious position. 
Their economy was in ruins, with few opportunities to earn money outside of trade with 
the United Kingdom.37 More importantly, though, according to the well-known Danish 
historian Thorsten Olesen, “the military condition was indeed miserable” in post-war 
Denmark.38 The country had placed a low priority on defense prior to the war, the 
Germans took what equipment they had during the occupation, and there was a small 
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supply of equipment on the market after the war.39 These factors combined to leave the 
Danes without any near-term prospects of being able to defend themselves. Meanwhile, it 
was becoming increasingly clear that the post-war environment would be quite 
threatening to the small country. As Olesen notes, “in contrast to Norway, Denmark 
could not even count geography in as a partial ally,” since “the escalation of the Cold 
War and the increased Soviet dominance of the Baltic area” made it “evident that 
Denmark, whether she liked it or not, was becoming a Northern European front line 
country positioned on the line of demarcation between East and West.”40 This was the 
situation that the post-war Danish government found itself in: it had almost no military 
capability with which to defend itself and ample need for protection.  
In response to this difficult situation Denmark began looking to outside entities 
for additional security. Although bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom and other 
countries were concluded after the war, multilateralism began to take hold in Denmark as 
it did elsewhere. Associating themselves with multinational organizations was not 
something the Danes took lightly, however, as they had a healthy fear of losing their 
sovereignty by joining an organization that would be dominated by much more powerful 
countries.41 Indeed, they recognized that the more security they received from 
multilateral organizations the more independence and freedom of action they had to give 
up.42 Still, the Danes embraced the United Nations (UN) as founders in 1945, but it soon 
became apparent that the Cold War conflict would play out in this arena as well and that 
the UN did not offer protection from the Soviet Union.43 In 1948 Denmark joined the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), but this endeavor also failed 
to provide the security that the Danes needed.  
Ultimately, Denmark was faced with negotiations for two multilateral 
organizations that might be able to provide the security that it needed: the SDU and 
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NATO. This reality subsequently left the Danes with three potential options for their 
protection in 1949: joining the SDU, joining NATO, or relying on neutrality and their 
own defensive capabilities. As will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, the 
Danes preferred the first option, but it was not to be for reasons beyond their control. This 
left only a decision between NATO membership and self-reliant neutrality, and the major 
parties in Denmark all agreed that the former was better than the latter.44 That is not to 
say, however, that this was an easy decision for them to make. Aside from the natural 
concerns that a traditionally neutral society would have with joining a multilateral 
collective defense organization, such as losing their autonomy or being dragged into 
unwanted wars, many Danes had serious doubts as to whether NATO would even be able 
to ensure their security.45 Consequently, the Hedtoft government in Denmark embraced 
NATO reluctantly and only as a lesser evil when negotiations for a Nordic alliance 
failed.46 
Further evidence of the reluctance of the Danes to join NATO can be seen in their 
actions after they joined the Alliance. Often going against the grain within the Alliance, 
the Danes banned Allies from permanently stationing troops in the country, and 
prevented the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory (except Greenland). 
Moreover, they have never spent the agreed-upon 2 percent of their GDP on their 
military. Consequently, Denmark has often been called a reluctant Ally that serves “as an 
Ally with reservations,” especially prior to recent changes in Danish attitudes towards the 
Alliance.47  
B. NORWAY 
Although Denmark had an unpleasant experience during the Second World War, 
Norway had it far worse. The Norwegian military was defeated after only two months of 
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fighting, which, as with the Danes, left a lasting scar on the Norwegian psyche. 
Furthermore, since the Norwegians had also tried to remain neutral in the conflict, the 
failure of this policy to protect Norwegian sovereignty would not soon be forgotten. 
While Danish institutions were mostly allowed to remain intact during the German 
occupation, Norway resisted Berlin far more and was punished by more direct and 
complete German control. Norwegians were allowed to trade only with Germany, and as 
a result their GDP had shrunk by 45 percent by the end of the war—the most of any 
German-occupied country.48 In the end, the proud Nordic country had been humiliated 
and devastated, with many towns destroyed and many thousands killed—not an 
experience that any Norwegian would like to see repeated in the future if they could help 
it.  
Before the war with Germany was even over the Norwegian government in exile 
in the United Kingdom began expressing concerns over potential problems with the 
Soviet Union in the post-war aftermath. In early 1944 the Norwegians told the British 
that they were concerned that the Soviet army would be the first to liberate Norway, and 
they asked allied planners in the United Kingdom to consider liberating both southern 
and northern Norway first so the Soviets could not “break in and occupy the country 
indefinitely.”49 Soon after the Soviets occupied northern Norway in late 1944 Norwegian 
concerns proved to be justified. During a meeting in November 1944 between the foreign 
ministers of Norway and the Soviet Union, Trygve Lie and Vyacheslav Molotov 
respectively, Molotov demanded that Norway cede Bear Island to the Soviets and 
establish a Norwegian-Soviet condominium over the Norwegian archipelago of 
Svalbard.50 Not surprisingly, these demands were completely unacceptable to the 
Norwegians, a fact that they were forced to make clear repeatedly to the Soviets, under a 
great deal of pressure, until the Soviets eventually dropped the issue in late 1947.51 
Additionally, although the Soviet army withdrew from northern Norway in 1945, 
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pressure such as that applied over the issue of Svalbard made it clear to the Norwegians 
that the Soviets cared little for assuring the Norwegians of their sovereignty and safety—
facts that certainly made them even more wary about their precarious security situation.  
Several other events in Europe in 1948 increased tensions and pushed Norway 
further from its traditional neutrality and primed it for NATO membership. First, the 
Soviets were forcing Finland into negotiations for what became the Finnish-Soviet 
Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Soon after this the 
Norwegians received word of the Soviet-supported communist coup in Czechoslovakia, 
in response to which the Norwegian premier, Einar Gerhardsen, declared an ideological 
war on communism in Norway on 29 February.52 Lastly, on 8 March Halvard Lange, the 
Norwegian foreign minister, revealed to his American and British counterparts that the 
Norwegian government had heard rumors from three sources that the Soviets would soon 
approach Oslo with demands for a mutual assistance pact and asked what support 
Norway might receive from the West if the Soviets insisted on such an arrangement.53  
These three events served two key purposes regarding Norway joining NATO. 
First, they caused Norwegian public opinion to turn sharply against communism and the 
Soviet Union, thus priming the country to seek protection from the West against Soviet 
aggression.54 Second, these events gave a group of European countries, led by the United 
Kingdom, both the will and the ability to begin serious negotiations with Ottawa and 
Washington for the creation of a security pact that would link Canada and the United 
States to the concerned Western European powers.55 Thus, these events helped both 
propel movement toward the eventual creation of NATO and to prepare Norway to be a 
member of the Alliance. 
Soviet aggression in Europe was thus the single most important factor that drove 
Norway into an alliance with the West. After the events of early 1948, Norwegians had, 
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in the words of the famous Finnish historian Max Jakobson, “lost their faith in neutrality. 
They believed the Soviet Union presented an immediate military menace and they were 
convinced that only the combined defensive power of the Western world, including the 
United States, could deter a Soviet aggression.”56 Norway was determined to link itself to 
the Atlantic community, and this conviction, as will be shown later, contributed to the 
demise of the SDU negotiations and left Norway with only one clear choice: to join 
NATO as a founding member.57 
An additional factor that contributed to Norway’s decision to seek NATO 
membership was the powerful influence of Halvard Lange and the rest of the ruling 
Norwegian Labor party. After all, it was this government that ultimately calculated that it 
was imperative for Norway to align with the West rather than settle for a neutral SDU, 
self-reliant neutrality, or even appeasement of the Soviet Union. Social historian Finn 
Olstad has even argued that “the key to understanding Norway’s accession to NATO is to 
be found in the role and influence of Halvard Lange,” since he led the charge in 
negotiating terms for the Alliance on behalf of Norway and ultimately fought for the 
country to join the organization.58 Although the Labor government as a whole would 
have preferred membership in an SDU that was itself tied to the West, since that was not 
possible the leaders of the party decided that NATO was the best option.59 Without this 
decision to change Norway’s path, the country would have defaulted to neutrality, 
whether alone or within a neutral SDU, and not joined the Alliance. 
C. THE SCANDINAVIAN DEFENSE UNION 
Although the unique histories of Denmark and Norway prior to 1948–1949 had in 
many ways prepared the countries to abandon non-alignment and seek protection from 
outside their borders, when discussions for an Atlantic alliance began in Washington in 
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March 1948 it was still not clear that the countries would ultimately be parties to the 
treaty. This was especially true when in May 1948 Sweden reacted to the news of a 
possible Atlantic security organization by proposing a non-aligned Scandinavian alliance 
consisting of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. This idea became popular enough in the 
region that on 9 September 1948 the foreign ministers of the three countries held a 
meeting and called for a study to look into the issue.60 As a consequence, the foreign 
ministers of Denmark and Norway, Gustav Rasmussen and Halvard Lange respectively, 
asked for a postponement of the talks regarding an Atlantic security organization.61 This 
delay proved easy for the Western powers to provide, since North Atlantic Treaty 
negotiations were already moving quite slowly in 1948 due in no small part to the general 
elections in progress in the United States.62 This, in turn, gave the Scandinavian countries 
room to consider their options. 
The Nordic neighbors mostly used this time to argue over the nature of the 
proposed SDU. The Danes were by far the most enthusiastic for a Scandinavian alliance, 
due mostly to their belief that immediate help in a war would come more readily from the 
powerful Swedish military than from other Western powers. According to contemporary 
discussions between Britain and the United States, the Danes were probably right in this 
regard. Additionally, the Danes believed they would be an early target if the Soviets 
invaded Europe, which made the need for immediate help all the more important. The 
Norwegians, on the other hand, were much less enthusiastic than the Danes about SDU 
negotiations because they were ultimately unwilling to rely solely on Danish and Swedish 
help if it came to war. The Norwegians had bitter recent memories of the Swedes aiding 
the Germans even while the Nazis occupied Oslo, which made trusting them completely a 
difficult proposition. However, since many Norwegians distrusted the United States and 
identified strongly as Scandinavians, the government had to at least appear to make an 
effort to make the SDU work, despite the effort seeming doomed from the start. Whether 
there was ever a possibility of Oslo compromising and accepting an SDU that was not 
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tied to the West has been the subject of much historical debate, but it seems clear that at 
least key figures such as Foreign Minister Lange, who aided Britain and the United States 
in sabotaging the negotiations, did not consider a neutral SDU a realistic option.63 
While Norway was determined that the SDU must be allied with the United 
States, Sweden was just as determined that it must be non-aligned, and Denmark 
primarily just wanted the union to exist.64 The countries’ inability to resolve this 
Norwegian-Swedish disagreement proved to be the primary cause for the collapse of the 
SDU negotiations.65 After Norway realized that Sweden would not budge on this issue, 
Oslo decided that it could not budge either. Norway abandoned the negotiations, and 
Denmark followed suit shortly thereafter. 
An additional factor that aided the collapse of the SDU negotiations was outside 
influence. Although the United Kingdom, the USSR, and the United States did not agree 
on much during this time, it seems they did agree that the SDU was a bad idea, although 
for different reasons. The Soviets thought that it was a thinly veiled Western alliance 
created solely to balance against them, which was of course an accurate reading of the 
situation.66 The British were internally divided regarding whether Denmark and Norway 
joining the SDU would be a good thing or not, since the British knew that they could not 
realistically provide the Scandinavians security if the Soviets were to attack in the short 
term, but British action ultimately showed that they favored Denmark and Norway in 
NATO instead of the SDU.67 The United States clearly preferred to share an alliance 
directly with the Nordic countries so that the NATO Allies could access their territory in 
peacetime, especially Greenland, and negotiations for the SDU threatened this.68  
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In their efforts to stop the formation of the SDU, London, Moscow, and 
Washington took separate paths. Britain thought it best to allow the talks to “blow 
themselves out,” believing that the different opinions of the Scandinavian countries 
would naturally cause the talks to fail with little outside influence.69 This caused the 
British to take a soft approach and simply play up the merits of the alternative to the 
SDU, an Atlantic security arrangement, and let Denmark and Norway realize for 
themselves that that was a better choice. The Soviets simply made it known that they 
opposed the creation of the SDU, which acted to weaken one of the SDU’s main 
supposed advantages over NATO: that it would draw less negative Soviet attention to the 
Scandinavian countries. The United States, however, did the most to counter the SDU 
negotiations. The most important position the United States took in this regard was to tell 
the Nordic countries that a neutral SDU would not receive assistance from the West in 
the form of military equipment or funding. While this was a blow to the SDU on 
Sweden’s end, it was crucial to Norway’s objection to the SDU remaining neutral, and in 
this way it greatly assisted the collapse of the SDU negotiations.70  
D. CONCLUSION 
As the SDU negotiations were officially breaking down in late January 1949, the 
Soviet Union sent the Norwegian government a note pressuring it not to join NATO.71 
Instead of fulfilling its intended purpose, the note backfired and enabled Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Lange to abandon hopes for the SDU and resume negotiations for the 
Atlantic pact.72 Denmark followed suit shortly afterwards, and both countries signed onto 
the Alliance later that year as founding members. 
As some historians have noted, however, Denmark and Norway did not 
completely abandon their traditions of neutrality after joining the Alliance. According to 
Magnus Petersson and Håkon Lunde Saxi, for example, “a certain residual neutralism can 
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perhaps be detected in some of their post-membership policies.”73 The Danes and 
Norwegians sought to deter a Soviet attack by presenting a strong and unified NATO, 
while also reassuring Moscow that no attack against the USSR would be carried out 
through their territory.74 In accomplishing these goals, the countries integrated into 
NATO’s defense structure as much as they could while still restricting NATO activity on 
their territories. Before the treaty was even signed the Norwegian government declared 
that no allied bases would be allowed on its territory as long as Norway was not 
threatened by an attack, and Denmark established a similar policy in 1953 with an 
exception given for bases on distant Greenland.75 Such actions made clear that even 
though the countries had abandoned their long histories of non-alignment and neutrality, 
they did not do so whole-heartedly. 
Ultimately, however, from this study’s perspective the most important finding is 
that the failures of neutrality for both Denmark and Norway in the Second World War 
caused traumatic experiences that made them willing to seek alternative arrangements in 
the future. Then, when faced with a post-war situation that included poor internal defense 
capabilities and rising threats to their continued sovereignty from the USSR, key Danish 
and Norwegian leaders chose to seek protection from stronger states. Although both 
states had to give the proposal for an SDU the first opportunity to provide this security, 
the inability of Norway and Sweden to compromise over the SDU’s Western alignment 
caused the negotiations to collapse. Left with no viable alternatives, and faced with a 
precarious security situation, both countries concluded that they had little choice but to 
join NATO. 
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III. FINLAND AND SWEDEN: CHOOSING NEUTRALITY 
While the post-Second World War environment led Denmark and Norway to 
abandon neutrality in favor of NATO membership, Finland and Sweden fought hard to 
remain neutral and were able to remain non-aligned throughout the Cold War. This 
chapter analyzes why Helsinki and Stockholm chose non-alignment and how they were 
able to follow through on these policy decisions despite strong pressures to choose a side. 
The primary research question to be addressed is, “why did Finland and Sweden choose 
not to join NATO as founding members?” 
 For Finland this question manifests itself as follows: “how and why did Finland 
remain neutral in the aftermath of the Second World War, rather than seek protection 
from the West?” Ultimately it will be argued that Finland was only narrowly able to 
avoid being engulfed by the Iron Curtain due to the recognition of its top leadership that 
the Finns had to appease Joseph Stalin and appear non-threatening to Soviet interests in 
order to maintain their sovereignty. That the Finns did not seek membership in NATO 
and were able to fend off direct Soviet control was aided by their impressive 
performances in previous wars against the USSR and the strong leadership of Finnish 
Presidents Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen. Moreover, the lack of support from the 
West meant that NATO membership was not a genuine option.  
Furthermore, this chapter argues that Sweden remained neutral due to a 
combination of factors: the inertia created by the strong historical ties to the policy, the 
inability to create the SDU, the failures of Western powers to influence Swedish foreign 
policy, the unwavering influence of Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén, the desire to 
stay out of any initial nuclear exchange between the East and the West, and the Swedish 
fear that aligning with the West would endanger Finland and upset the Nordic balance. 




Although Finland has a long history with Russia, little of it had been as an 
independent country when the Soviet Union demanded in the autumn of 1939 that 
Finland cede territory on the Karelian Isthmus and islands near the port of Hanko to 
Moscow. Indeed, before the Republic of Finland was formed in 1919 Russia controlled 
all of this land. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in August 1939 the Soviets finally 
had the ability and breathing room required to start taking what they wanted in Finland.76 
Despite the urgings of many foreign governments, the Finnish government refused to 
cede the demanded territories to Moscow, which led to the Soviets attacking Finland in 
November 1939. Thus, began the Winter War, which the Finns, lacking any security 
treaties with other states, were forced to fight alone.77 France and Britain did, however, 
notify Stalin that they were considering sending an expeditionary force to Finland’s aid, a 
possibility which threatened to escalate and prolong the war greatly.78 It is likely that this 
threat prevented the Soviets from taking all of Finland, which (it is widely believed) they 
were more than capable of doing within a few months.79  
Instead, the war ended on March 12, 1940, when the Finns signed a peace treaty 
that saved their sovereignty but cost them roughly 10 percent of their territory and 
required a 30 year lease on the port of Hanko.80 Barely half a year later, Germany had 
defeated France, and Britain was in no position to help the Finns; only Hitler’s influence 
prevented Stalin from following through on his clear desires to take all of Finland, and 
the Finns knew it.81 It is no surprise, then, that Helsinki signed a transit agreement with 
Berlin that allowed German troops to travel across Finland on the way from the Baltics to 
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Norway; gradually the two countries became increasingly entangled.82 When the 
Germans invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Finland sensed an opportunity to 
take back lost territory and established strong ties with the Germans, who the Finns 
expected to win and eventually rule Russia.83 Finland declared war on the USSR on 26 
June 1941, and what the Finns call the Continuation War began.84  
As it turned out, however, the Finns had chosen the wrong side. Once this became 
clear to Finland in February 1943, their leaders decided to begin trying to exit the war on 
as favorable terms with the Soviets as possible.85 In September 1944 an armistice was 
signed that ended the Continuation War and allowed Finland to maintain its 
independence—a feat not accomplished by any other country in the path of the Red 
Army, but one that was accomplished by the Finns in the previous Winter War as well. 
As Finnish expert Max Jakobson points out, this achievement was only possible because 
“Finnish resistance to the Soviet offensives was strong enough to raise the cost of 
breaking it to a point at which continuing the war against Finland put more important 
Soviet interests at risk.”86 In the Winter War this risk was that of the involvement of 
France and Britain, while in 1944 the Soviet units fighting in Finland were needed for 
“the race to Berlin.”87 In both cases the Finns fought with great skill and tenacity, 
inflicting far more casualties than they sustained and earning Soviet respect. In the 
Winter War, for example, Finns killed over twice as many soldiers as they lost, wounded 
over four times as many, and destroyed over eight times as many aircraft.88 Furthermore, 
and most importantly, in both cases Moscow chose to make peace before destroying the 
Finnish army, thus allowing Finland to survive as an independent country.89  
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While the Armistice of September 1944 protected Finnish sovereignty, it was also 
quite costly. The Finns had to turn on the German forces and drive them from Finland, to 
accept numerical limitations placed on their military, to open their ports and airports to 
Soviet operations, and to lease the naval base of Porkkala, situated just 30km from 
Helsinki, to the Soviets.90 Thus, the threat of the Soviets occupying Finland was by no 
means gone in the immediate aftermath of the war. According to Tuomo Polvinen, 
Finnish President C. G. E. Mannerheim and Prime Minister Ernst von Born “believed that 
the bolshevization of Finland could hardly be avoided” after the signing of the 
armistice.91 The same conclusion was reached by observers on the outside looking in, 
such as the secretary-general of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Erik Boheman, who 
commented that the lease of Porkkala meant “the end of Finland’s independence: the 
country would become a protectorate of the Soviet Union.”92 
It was under this pressure, and as one of the defeated powers, that Finland entered 
the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris. Consequently, the Finns could do little but try not 
to antagonize the Soviets and hope that their former Western partners would help them. 
The first instruction that President Paasikivi gave his delegation at the Peace Conference 
was “always to bear in mind that the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union 
had overriding importance and that nothing was to be done in Paris that might give rise to 
the suspicion that Finland was plotting with the Western Powers against the Soviet 
Union.”93 This instruction was important because among the great powers only the Soviet 
Union and Britain had declared war on Finland and thus had a basis for deciding the 
peace terms with Helsinki. As Jakobson notes, however, Britain never actually fought 
Finland, so “British interest in making peace with Finland was as formal as had been the 
                                                 
90 Bergquist et al., “The Effects,” 8. 
91 Polvinen, Between East and West, 35. 
92 Ibid., 36. 
93 Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, 25. 
 27 
war between them.”94 Consequently, only the Soviet Union “had a direct national interest 
in the Finnish treaty and the power to do something about it.”95  
In the end, peace terms were decided by the Soviets and forced on Finland 
without its opinion being taken into account, which deepened the disillusionment that the 
Finns had with Western policy. The Treaty of Paris confirmed the harshest terms of the 
previous armistice, including: heavy war reparations; the lease of Porkkala; the Soviet 
use of Finnish railways, waterways, and roads to reach the port; limitations on the 
capabilities of the Finnish military; and the cession of almost 10 percent of Finnish 
territory to the Soviets. Additionally, article three of the treaty prevented Finland from 
joining any anti-Soviet alliance, thus making the legality of Finland’s entry into an 
Atlantic alliance in the future hazy at best. However, this history of Western inaction 
regarding the defense of Finland was hardly one that would entice the Finns to trust the 
West to protect them from the Soviets in the future under NATO auspices anyway.96 The 
lesson that Finnish leaders learned from all of this was that neutrality was their best hope 
for national survival, and the primary reason that this policy failed in the Winter War was 
that the Soviets had not believed Finland would remain neutral in the coming world 
war.97 Consequently, Finnish leaders concluded that their primary task in the aftermath of 
the Second World War was to create a new relationship with their eastern neighbors 
founded on Soviet trust that the Finns would not fight against them. 
The Finnish leaders who developed this strategy and had the power to carry it out 
were Paasikivi and Kekkonen. The former was prime minister in 1944 before being 
elected president in both 1946 and 1950, while the latter was speaker of the Parliament 
and a close advisor to Paasikivi in the late 1940s, prime minister in 1950–1953 and 1954–
1956, and finally president himself from 1956 to 1982.  
Taking Finland’s future into his hands, Paasikivi had two main tasks in the 
aftermath of the Second World War: to convince Stalin that he could trust Finland with 
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independence, and to persuade the Finnish people to come together to achieve this task.98 
In accomplishing these goals Paasikivi became perhaps the greatest contributor both to 
Finland’s decision to remain neutral after the war and its ability to do so without being 
absorbed into the Soviet bloc. 
Evidence of Paasikivi’s and Kekkonen’s influence and success can be seen in the 
Finnish government’s response to the post-war armistice and treaty. Fulfillment of the 
obligations placed on Finland by these agreements became the primary goal of the new 
government, because by doing so Paasikivi hoped to show Moscow that Russia could 
trust Finland to keep its word.99 The government paid its war reparations on time, despite 
amounting to 15 percent of Finland’s GDP for the first year and 11 percent in the 
second.100 As Jakobson points out, “Finland is probably the only country in modern 
history that has voluntarily paid its war reparations in full.”101 Furthermore, Paasikivi’s 
belief that Finland needed to appear non-threatening to the Soviets led him to restrict the 
Finnish press, suppress Fascist movements, install members of the communist SKDL 
party in his government, and prosecute former Finnish leaders on charges of war guilt.102 
This last issue was taken up not only to show the Soviets that the new Finnish 
government regretted the previous leaders’ decision to invade the Soviet Union with 
Germany, but also to prevent these men from being tried by the Soviets themselves. In 
the end, only eight Finns were tried, and they received sentences up to a maximum of 10 
years but served no more than half of their terms.103 Lastly, Paasikivi decided that 
Finland would not accept Marshall Aid and took every effort to avoid showing favor to 
the West, all in an effort to allay any Soviet fears regarding the USSR’s northwestern 
border. 
                                                 
98 Jakobson, Finland in the New Europe, 53–54. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 54. 
102 Maude, The Finnish Dilemma, 31. 
103 Ibid., 32. 
 29 
This strategy of keeping a distance from the West and trying to satisfy the Soviets 
without further compromising Finnish sovereignty continued after Moscow orchestrated 
a coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and, soon thereafter, sent Paasikivi an invitation to 
negotiate a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Although nearly 80 percent of the 
Finnish Parliament and the majority of the public were against agreeing to negotiations 
out of fear that they would lead to a military alliance, Paasikivi and Kekkonen (then the 
speaker of the Parliament) considered it a political test to see if Finland could be trusted 
not to join a Western alliance.104 According to Finnish expert Rinna Kullaa, this was “a 
test both leaders were determined that Finland should not fail.”105 
Consequently, Paasikivi sent a delegation to Moscow to begin negotiations in 
March 1948, and he chose Kekkonen to lead the group in the Soviet Union while he 
directed actions from Helsinki. As evidence of the fears that Finns still had regarding the 
possibility of losing their sovereignty to the Soviets, Paasikivi reportedly remained in 
Finland in order to help prevent any communist coup from taking place during the 
negotiations.106  
It was this fear for the survival of Finland, and the knowledge that Finns had only 
political means at their disposal and no help from the West, that drove Paasikivi and 
Kekkonen to propose terms for a treaty that would last for 10 years, said that Finland 
would repel any attempted attack against the Soviet Union that went through Finland, and 
reconfirmed article three of the Paris peace treaty, which prevented Finland from joining 
any alliance directed against the Soviet Union.107 Additionally, this proposal included a 
preamble that stated that the treaty had been drafted “taking into account Finland’s desire 
to stay outside the conflicts of interest between the great powers.”108 To the pleasant 
surprise of the Finnish delegation, Moscow was pleased with this proposal and 
negotiations concluded rather quickly.  
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Once again proving his importance to Finland’s continued neutrality, Paasikivi 
was able to convince the reluctant Finnish Parliament to accept the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, despite the fact that the majority of Finns would 
have preferred not to endorse it.109 This final act solidified Finland’s inability to join 
NATO as a founding member in 1949 and established what became known as the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen line—a foreign policy aimed at assuring the Soviets that their border 
with Finland was secure while resisting any attempts by Moscow to impede Finnish 
sovereignty. 
Although Paasikivi and Kekkonen played a pivotal role in developing and 
carrying out this policy, scholar Klaus Törnudd has pointed out that it is not clear that 
Finland could have chosen anything but neutrality. Finland was prevented from joining 
NATO, both legally by the treaties it signed and physically due to the Soviet military 
presence that Finland was forced to host, and Finland had no desire to join a military 
alliance with the Soviets, so the only option available was neutrality.110 Consequently, 
although Paasikivi was not a neutralist himself, he saw no prudent choice but to take the 
path he did.111 Thus, Törnudd argues, “the policy of neutrality was an inevitable 
consequence of the struggle for power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.”112 
A final reason that the Finns chose the path of neutrality after the Second World 
War can be found in the failures of Western policy to influence them to do otherwise. It 
has already been noted that Western powers did little to help Finland in the Winter War 
or to prevent harsh terms from being forced on Finland in the Paris peace treaties. 
Furthermore, it is clear that this Western inaction contributed to the Finnish judgment that 
Helsinki could not count on the West. Convinced that they could not win against the East 
alone, the Finns believed that they had no choice but to appease the Soviets. The question 
remains, however, as to why the West allowed history to unfold in this way. 
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The short answer is that, after the Second World War, the West soon wrote 
Finland off as lost to Soviet influence, especially since Western leaders were not willing 
or able to defend Finland against Soviet attack if that became necessary. Internal British 
Foreign Office documents reveal that the British concluded that Finland was lost to the 
Russian orbit and that the British would have difficulties in changing that due to the 
strong position of the Soviets in the region.113 Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén 
agreed with this conclusion and noted that, although an alliance between Finland and the 
Soviet Union would be bad for Sweden, Finland was already within the Soviet sphere.114 
Additionally, the British Foreign Secretary in the immediate post-war era, Ernest Bevin, 
prevented Finland from being invited to Atlantic alliance discussions because he knew 
the West could not follow through on any security guarantees given to the Finns.115 In 
sum, Paasikivi’s government was not given the option of trying to bend the rules of its 
peace treaty and joining NATO, even if the Finns probably would have declined an 
invitation anyway. 
B. SWEDEN 
Sweden’s experience with the policy of neutrality was just the opposite of 
Finland’s. At the conclusion of the Second World War, Sweden had remained both 
neutral and out of war for over 150 years, and most Swedes considered the latter a direct 
outcome of the former.116 The policy had been viewed as a success for so long that many 
in Sweden believed that “a good Swede is a neutral Swede.”117 Indeed, Christian 
Günther, the Swedish foreign minister during the war, claimed in his last official speech 
that “Sweden succeeded in what everybody had wished for, that is to avoid war,” and that 
Swedes were even “able to help [their brother people] in so far as was possible.”118 
Minister Unden, who probably had the greatest impact of all on Sweden’s decision not to 
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join NATO, argued that neutrality was so popular that public opinion would not allow 
any change from it.119  
Swedish expert Ann-Sofie Dahl has argued that the popularity of neutrality in 
Sweden was and is still due in part to “the idea that only nonaligned actors can pursue an 
activist, and even morally superior, foreign policy.”120 Thus, if Sweden wanted to 
continue to be a good example for the world to follow, then it had to remain neutral. This 
idea, combined with the security that many Swedes believed neutrality brought them, 
created a considerable amount of public resistance to any change in Swedish foreign 
policy that made it politically impractical for the government to join NATO, if it had 
wished to do so. 
Many Swedes, however, found reason to doubt whether it was neutrality or other 
external causes that kept Sweden out of the Second World War, and it is clear that 
Sweden was not even able to maintain complete neutrality in the conflict. In June 1941 
Germany demanded that Sweden allow the Wehrmacht to use Swedish railroads to 
transfer troops to Finland.121 Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson did not want to 
sacrifice Swedish neutrality by agreeing, but King Gustaf Adolf and most of the military 
were pro-German and lobbied for the request to be approved, which it eventually was.122 
Further troop transfers via Swedish railroads were reluctantly agreed to by Hansson in 
August 1941, and in September the government agreed to provide Germany a line of 
credit to pay for the 45,000 tons of iron ore that the Swedes sold the Nazis every day in 
1941.123 The Soviets, knowing how critical this iron was to Germany, sunk Swedish 
ships to prevent its delivery, further tainting Swedish neutrality.124 To top it off, Sweden 
evacuated German soldiers injured in Finland to hospitals in Norway, and German 
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soldiers routinely vacationed in or travelled through Sweden when on leave.125 While this 
cooperation with Germany certainly helped keep Sweden from being invaded, Swedish 
historian Krister Wahlback argues that even this probably would have failed to protect 
Swedish independence if the British had been defeated by Germany in 1940–1941 or if 
the Soviet Union and the United States had not joined the conflict when they did.126 
Thus, although the majority of Swedes wanted to remain neutral after the conflict ended, 
there were plenty of arguments to be made by Swedish politicians for abandoning 
neutrality and joining NATO, if they so desired. 
Further evidence of this can be seen in the fact that Sweden actually did attempt 
to abandon neutrality by creating the SDU, which would have consisted of a military 
alliance between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Although the idea was that this union 
would be non-aligned itself and stay neutral in any war not involving an attack on one of 
the three countries, this was still a complete departure from Sweden’s policy of 
independent neutrality that it had maintained previously.127 Unfortunately for the other 
states that desired an Atlantic alliance, however, Sweden only arrived at the decision to 
try to create the SDU because the government saw that Norway was moving towards the 
Atlantic alliance, and Sweden saw an opportunity to counter this by appealing to 
Norwegian feelings of Scandinavianism.128 Ultimately, negotiations broke down because 
the United States wanted Denmark and Norway in the Atlantic alliance and told all three 
countries that a neutral SDU would not be able to purchase arms from the United 
States.129 Consequently, the Norwegians, with their previous German occupation fresh in 
their minds, decided they would only join the SDU if it was linked to NATO. Sweden, 
however, would not budge from its stance that the Union must be neutral.130 Thus, 
negotiations crumbled, and Sweden was left to choose between isolated neutrality and 
following the Norwegians and the Danes into NATO. 
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One of the reasons that Sweden ultimately chose isolated neutrality was that 
American and British leaders failed to influence them to do otherwise. This failure was 
caused in large part by American and British disagreement on how to best handle the 
reluctant Swedes, which resulted in the two countries choosing opposite strategies. The 
United States decided to employ a heavy hand with the Swedes and began “rebuffing 
feelers from Sweden on informal staff discussions, stalling export licenses for military 
technology to Sweden, removing Swedish ports from U.S. naval units’ visit schedules to 
Scandinavia, and reiterating the fact that, unless Sweden abandoned neutrality, no last 
minute help would be forthcoming from the U.S. in an emergency.”131 Furthermore, the 
United States told Sweden that it could not expect to buy American military supplies if it 
remained neutral, and in 1948 the U.S. ambassador to Sweden, Freeman Matthews, and 
the U.S. Counsellor at the embassy, Hugh Cumming, told a group of Swedish 
businessmen that in a war the United States would bomb Swedish industries “out of 
existence” in order to prevent their use by the Soviets.132 The result of this policy was 
that the Swedish military, afraid of being isolated and without American military 
equipment, came to believe that their government “was making a serious mistake” and 
consequently began “pulling all possible strings within and outside the Swedish 
government to make it change its mind” regarding neutrality.133  
The British, on the other hand, preferred what Robin Hankey, the head of the 
British Foreign Office’s Northern Department, called “crafty diplomacy.”134 The British 
thought that the United States had pressed Sweden too hard and that this was counter-
productive.135 The British, in turn, took a more agreeable stance towards Sweden and 
began selling Vampire jet aircraft to Stockholm, which completely undermined the 
American strategy.136 Ambassador Matthews lamented in response that the “reasonably 
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good chances of getting Sweden into [the] western camp are being sacrificed by [the] 
short run interest of [the] British aircraft industry and British ignorance of Swedish 
psychology,” and that if the British did not cancel the contract then “we may just as well 
forget any thought of winning Sweden from neutrality.”137 At the urging of London, the 
United States eventually gave up trying to influence the Swedes by withholding supplies, 
and this left the Americans without a strategy at all. This deficit, combined with what the 
Foreign Office interpreted as a lack of urgency from Washington regarding the formation 
of the Atlantic alliance, hamstrung the attempts by the British to convince Sweden to 
seek protection from the United States.138 The U.S. position, in the end, was that only 
Greenland and Iceland were necessary for the Alliance because of their strategic value, 
and Sweden could remain outside if it preferred. Ultimately, Bevin and U.S. Secretary of 
State George Marshall gave up on Sweden and decided not to invite the Swedes to the 
negotiations that led to the formation of NATO, thus signaling the final failure of U.S. 
and British policy to sway Sweden into the Alliance.139 
Although the Americans and British failed in this way, it is possible that they 
never could have succeeded in the first place as long as Sweden’s foreign minister was 
Östen Undén. Undén insisted throughout the period that there would be no change to 
Sweden’s foreign policy of neutrality, saying that “it would be disastrous… if Russia got 
the impression that Sweden might be used as a base for attacks upon Russia.”140 
Consequently, after a speech on 4 February 1948, in which Undén confirmed his trust in 
neutrality, Ambassador Matthews concluded that “any Swedish departure from neutrality 
must be over Undén’s dead body.”141 The British conclusion was the same: no 
fundamental changes in Swedish foreign policy would happen with Undén in charge.142 
This realization directly led to U.S. and British decisions to proceed in creating the 
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Alliance without Sweden.143 Thus, Undén’s role in preventing Sweden from joining 
NATO as a founding member cannot be overstated.  
According to new research performed by Robert Dalsjö, one reason behind 
Undén’s determination to stay neutral was that by doing so Sweden could remain outside 
of any devastating initial nuclear exchange between the East and the West if the Cold 
War turned hot.144 This research indicates that the Swedish leaders understood that they 
would be forced into the fray if war erupted, and in such a conflict they would join the 
Western forces, but that they preferred to join the war after the initial salvos were 
fired.145 Evidence that this is true can be found in documents about previously secret 
arrangements that the Swedish and U.S. governments had made for the protection of both 
Sweden and the NATO Alliance in the event of war. Sweden had secretly agreed to allow 
the overflight of U.S. aircraft for bombing missions against the Soviet Union, had 
secretly made preparations to receive NATO forces and provide help to the NATO war 
effort, and had cooperated extensively in intelligence sharing with the West.146 This 
cooperation ultimately proved fruitful, as Sweden was rewarded with the ability to 
purchase American arms starting in 1952, when it became part of the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act.147 The Soviet Union even knew about these secret Western ties, further 
decreasing the likelihood that Sweden could stay neutral in war.148 However, as has been 
noted, Swedish leaders viewed the possibility of avoiding inclusion in the Soviet Union’s 
initial nuclear attack plan as a convincing reason to remain outside the Atlantic alliance in 
peacetime. At the same time, Swedish preparations to work with NATO in the event of 
war might have acted to enhance the overall Western deterrence posture. 
An additional argument made by Swedish leaders for not participating in NATO’s 
creation centered on what became known as the “Finland Question.” That is the argument 
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that if Sweden aligned with the West, the Soviets would find it necessary to exert greater 
control over Finland in response.149 Finland becoming a Soviet satellite was not an 
acceptable outcome, so the Swedes argued both publicly and privately that they could not 
join the Alliance.150 This upheld what became known as the Nordic balance, the array of 
international relations that emerged in the Nordic region, with Denmark, Iceland, and 
Norway in the Western camp, Finland in the Soviet orbit, and Sweden neutral in between, 
thus balancing the system. Jakobson, however, has argued against the proponents of this 
idea, suggesting that the notion that Sweden stayed neutral for the sake of Finland “would 
make as much, or rather, as little sense [as] to claim that Finland fought to retain her 
independence in order to make it easier for Sweden to stay neutral.”151 In any case, 
whether their purported concern for Finland’s status was sincere or not, the Swedes 
succeeded in using the argument to justify their neutrality to the Americans and British: 
the British Foreign Office eventually pointed to this argument themselves and even 
believed Soviet pressure on Finland was aimed primarily at keeping Sweden out of 
negotiations for an Atlantic alliance.152 Thus, the Finland question and the idea of a 
Nordic balance appear to have played an important role in Sweden’s decision not to join 
NATO regardless of how sincere the Swedish politicians were in invoking it. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Although there were powerful pro-alliance forces in both Finland and Sweden 
that might have propelled either or both of the countries into joining NATO as founding 
members, these forces ultimately lost to more powerful ones that kept both states neutral. 
The Finns salvaged their independence at the end of both the Winter War and the Second 
World War by hard fighting, but learned from these conflicts that they could not trust the 
West to defend them against their Eastern neighbor. This lesson proved true in the post-
war negotiations, after which the Soviet Union imposed harsh terms on Finland that 
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prevented it from legally joining NATO. Still unconfident in their ability to maintain their 
independence from Moscow, the Finns followed the powerful leadership of Paasikivi and 
Kekkonen and signed a treaty with the Soviet Union that guaranteed both Finnish 
sovereignty and neutrality in exchange for promising not to join a Western alliance. 
Sweden, on the other hand, had a much easier path to joining NATO as a 
founding member, but turned it down due to a variety of reasons. Chief among these were 
the strong public support for maintaining neutrality caused by a long and successful 
national history with the policy and the failures of Swedish politicians to forge the SDU 
and of Western diplomats to sway the influential Undén away from a neutral stance. 
Additionally, the Swedish government wished to stay out of the Alliance in order to 
avoid any initial nuclear attack against NATO members and desired to maintain the 
Nordic balance in order to avoid endangering Finland by joining NATO. 
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IV. FINLAND AND SWEDEN IN A CHANGING SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter will address a range of issues that may affect the prospects for future 
NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, including the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, the 
likely departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU), and the election 
of President Donald Trump. The primary research question to be addressed is, “what are 
the prospects of Finland or Sweden seeking membership in NATO, and what 
developments might lead them to seek membership?” Additional questions to be 
addressed revolve around issues that impact this central question. As suggested above, 
these factors include the crisis in Ukraine, Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump as 
president of the United States. Moreover, what resistance to change in Finland and 
Sweden would have to be overcome for these states to seek membership? What changes 
would be required in Finland or Sweden for them to be eligible to join the Alliance? 
What developments could reverse the trend of Helsinki and Stockholm becoming 
increasingly close to NATO? 
This chapter discusses Finland and Sweden separately before undertaking a 
combined and comparative analysis.  
A. FINLAND 
Finland’s foreign policies, including its military alignment decisions, are heavily 
influenced by its geographic position. Although Finns think of themselves as culturally 
and ideologically aligned with the West, they have always felt the presence of their 
powerful neighbor to the east, Russia. Finns have not often been able to take their 
sovereignty for granted in recent history. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland 
abandoned its policy of neutrality, which had served the Finns throughout the Cold War, 
by joining the EU in 1995 and adopting a policy of military non-alignment in peace 
without the promise of neutrality if a war erupted. This policy was subsequently 
recalibrated as “no membership in military alliances” in 2007.153 Bound by the EU’s 
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mutual defense clause, however, Finland would most likely be unable to stay neutral in 
any major conflict in Europe.154 Consequently, the Finns are now bound to their 
European Union partners’ security and have already chosen their side in any major 
conflict between the East and the West. Finland is still, however, bound to Russia in 
many practical ways and therefore continues to pursue cooperation with this neighbor. 
Despite EU (and consequently Finnish) sanctions on Russia, Finland still imported 64 
percent of its oil from Russia in 2015, and only Germany and Sweden exported more 
goods to Finland that year.155 This important trade relationship, including Finnish 
dependence on Russian energy resources, continues to play an important role as the 
country debates NATO membership. 
Despite these Russian ties, Finland and Sweden have both sought ways to tie 
themselves even closer to NATO since the Ukraine crisis began in late 2013.156 Both 
countries are members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and its Enhanced 
Opportunities Program that was created in 2014. Furthermore, both states signed Host 
Nation Support agreements in 2014. According to a report on the issues involved with 
Finland’s possible NATO membership commissioned by the Finnish government last 
year, both countries are “nearly as close to the Atlantic Alliance as it is possible to be” as 
non-member states.157 The result of this close cooperation is that both countries are 
essentially “NATO-ready,” with very few difficulties remaining for the countries to 
overcome in order to become members.158  
In addition to their official legal standing as partners of NATO, Finland and 
Sweden have voluntarily participated in NATO-led operations in the Balkans, 
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Indeed, their actions have mirrored those of actual Allies to 
the point that, according to Leo Michel, “they are now widely regarded as virtual 
                                                 
154 Richard Milne, “Once a Taboo, NATO Membership Now a Hot Topic in Finland,” Financial 
Times, April 17, 2015. 
155 “Finland Trade Statistics,” World Integrated Trade Solutions, accessed March 2, 2017, 
http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/FIN. 
156 Fiskvik, “Nordic Security,” 1. 
157 Bergquist et al., “The Effects,” 5. 
158 Ibid. 
 41 
Allies.”159 Still, rising threats to European security have caused NATO to renew its 
emphasis on its collective defense tasks. This has underscored the distinction between 
NATO members and partners since the latter do not have a seat at the collective defense 
planning table.160 This, in turn, makes it clear that unless (or until) Finland and Sweden 
become NATO Allies they are not entitled to Article 5 (collective defense) benefits. 
Russia’s aggressive behavior of late has reignited the debate in Finland over how 
best to defend the nation’s sovereignty from outside threats, and the question of whether 
to join NATO is at the core of this discussion. Finnish president Sauli Niinistö recently 
complained that the loudest voices in this debate hail from the two extremes: those who 
want to join NATO immediately and those who are fundamentally opposed to ever 
joining the Alliance.161 Among the political parties, however, the split is between parties 
that favor immediate membership and those that desire to keep the door to membership 
open indefinitely without going through it in the near future. Currently only the 
conservative parties in Finland officially desire NATO membership, and the other parties 
are split on the issue.162 
Although the legal process in Finland does not require that a referendum take 
place in order for the country to join the Alliance, many Finns believe that their 
government has promised them a referendum on this issue, and 64 percent of Finns 
recently surveyed say that this would be the best way to make the decision.163 
Furthermore, Mika Aaltola from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs argues that 
“Finnish foreign policy is dominated by consensus,” and since Finnish politicians believe 
a consensus on joining NATO to be impossible for the time being, they are “reluctant to 
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speculate and disagree.”164 Consequently, although the debate on membership has 
increased in intensity since the Ukraine crisis began in late 2013, Finnish politicians 
require another catalyst before a referendum is called for. 
One such catalyst could simply be a shift in public support from a majority of 
Finns being against joining NATO to a majority being in favor. Many argue, however, 
that the only thing necessary for this to happen is for Finnish politicians to advocate 
membership openly.165 Indeed, a recent opinion poll shows that for the first time a 
majority of Finns would change their stances and support NATO membership if their 
political leaders encouraged them to do so.166  
Without this happening, the most recent poll, which was conducted by the Finnish 
government in late 2016, shows that only 25 percent of Finns advocate seeking 
immediate NATO membership while 61 percent are against near-term membership and 
14 percent are undecided. Although polls showed an increase in support for NATO 
membership after the Ukraine crisis began in late 2013, there has been a slight but 
consistent decline in support since then. Additionally, when asked if they would support 
NATO membership if Sweden decided to join the Alliance, only a small increase of 
Finns supported membership, up to 34 percent in the affirmative with 54 percent against 
and 11 percent undecided—numbers almost identical to those in 2007. That said, a vast 
majority of Finns view cooperation with NATO and the United States as positive, while 
59 percent of Finns said in 2016 that they will be in a less safe world in the next five 
years than they are in the present—a higher number than any year since the question was 
first asked in 1990, with the exception of 2015.167 These poll numbers tell the story of a 
Finnish population that recognizes that it is in an increasingly volatile world but is 
divided on how best to respond to the issues that Finland faces. While many Finns want 
                                                 
164 Matti Huuhtanen, “Finnish Report Highlights Russian Threat of NATO Membership,” Associated 
Press, April 29, 2016, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.libproxy.nps.edu/resources/doc/nb/news/
15C8DAD5D0CF4C88?p=AWNB. 
165 Michel, “Finland, Sweden, and NATO,” 9. 
166 Wolff, “The Future of NATO Enlargement,” 14–15. 
167 “ABDI (MTS) December 2016 Figures in English,” The Advisory Board for Defence Information, 
http://www.defmin.fi/files/3578/ABDI_(MTS)_December_2016_figures_in_english.pdf. 
 43 
to seek shelter under the NATO umbrella, the majority think continued military non-
alignment is the safest path to take. Although most Finns are against immediate NATO 
membership, they are generally agreed that Finland needs to cooperate with NATO, the 
United States, and their other European partners. Combined with an uncertain security 
environment, this could easily make for a future swing in public support for NATO.  
The reasons that Finland might cite for joining NATO, after all, are abundant. To 
start, the 2016 government report on possible Finnish membership in NATO noted that 
“Finland is a Western country, a member of the broader family of like-minded 
democracies.”168 Consequently, politicians such as Finland’s former Prime Minister 
Alexander Stubb have argued that Finland is destined to join NATO because it will 
“bring [Finns] to [their] natural value base of western democracies.”169 Additionally, the 
2016 Finnish report recognized that if a major conflict in Europe developed both EU and 
NATO collective defense measures would be activated, but non-NATO states would not 
have a seat at the NATO planning table.170 Consequently, Finland could find itself bound 
to participate in such a conflict but excluded from most joint planning for it. Furthermore, 
if Finland were attacked alone, only EU mutual defense clauses would be activated, 
which even the Finnish government’s report admitted would not be sufficient to protect 
Finnish sovereignty.171 Regional cooperation with other Nordic partners would fare no 
better, as the report noted that this would “clearly not [be] sufficient given ongoing 
security challenges.”172 Many Finnish experts agree that EU and regional partnerships 
would be insufficient to deter or defeat Russian aggression, and add that this is unlikely 
to change in the foreseeable future.173 Indeed, there is general agreement that such 
deterrence and defense would require guarantees from the United States, which insists on 
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dealing with security issues through NATO, where Washington has a seat at the table, 
rather than through the EU.174 
While many Finns desire to join NATO for its security guarantees, others see 
NATO as a multinational instrument through which Finland can protect its international 
interests. This group argues that Finland’s status as a NATO Partner constrains the 
country too much, and that Finland must become a member to reap the full benefits of the 
Alliance.175 Furthermore, the Finnish government’s 2016 report pointed out that Finland 
could “punch above its weight in the Alliance” due to the significant intelligence-
gathering opportunities that its geography affords and its expertise in cyber defense and 
hybrid warfare.176 Rather than dilute Finland’s power, this bloc of pro-NATO Finns 
argues, membership in the Alliance would give Finland another platform on which to 
wield influence and advance its international interests. 
Financially speaking, NATO membership would cost Finland very little. Finns 
would owe approximately EUR 55 million per year and be required to send around 80 
people to work for the Alliance. Additionally, if Finland chose to honor the NATO rule 
requiring Allies to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense, which only 4 of 28 Allies 
currently do, it would need to increase its military budget by EUR 730 million a year. 
Considering that the Finns are currently spending 1.64 percent of their GDP on defense 
for a current budget of EUR 3.41 billion based on NATO definitions, and they already 
plan to increase defense spending on their own by 0.3-0.4 percent of their GDP in the 
2020s, reaching the NATO goal of 2 percent of GDP is already scheduled to occur 
whether they join the Alliance or not. Thus, the Finns would need to change little 
financially in order to join the Alliance.177 
As previously mentioned, opponents to NATO membership for Finland can be 
separated into two categories: those who never want to join NATO and those who think 
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that now is simply not the right time. The first group contains policy advocates on both 
sides of the political spectrum. Those on the right argue that Finland’s history has proven 
that it cannot rely on outsiders to protect the country and that joining the Alliance might 
hurt Finland’s security by diverting resources away from national defense and to fighting 
“the wars of others.”178 On the left, the arguments are that Finland should be an example 
of neutralism and pacifism for the world and that integration into multinational 
organizations will only increase the risks of involvement in international conflicts.179 The 
second group typically argues that Finland’s existing ties to NATO are sufficient and that 
Finns would gain little by becoming members while committing themselves 
unnecessarily to new obligations.180 Others in this group believe that Finland could 
quickly join NATO anytime that it desires if it becomes necessary, so Helsinki should 
wait until it is in fact necessary.181 This sentiment was echoed by the current Prime 
Minister of Finland, Juha Sipilä, who said in 2015 that, although he is against 
membership, he believes “there should be a debate on NATO membership” because 
Finns “have to be very careful with the issue all the time and we can’t close the door.”182 
This camp appears to contain a plurality of Finns, and they are clearly open to changing 
their opinions if events unfold that demand such change. 
B. SWEDEN 
Finland’s Nordic neighbor, Sweden, has had a similar path to its current policy of 
military non-alignment. The Swedish government broke with its centuries-long policy of 
neutrality by joining the EU in 1995, and since then Stockholm has only further distanced 
itself from this policy. The Swedish government has not mentioned an intention to remain 
neutral in a conflict affecting Swedish interests in any foreign policy declaration since 
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2002.183 Furthermore, an official report by the Swedish Defence Commission in 2008 
stated that “Sweden will not remain passive should a disaster or an attack afflict another 
[EU] member country or Nordic country,” later explaining that Sweden’s response could 
include military action.184 This sentiment was echoed by a Defence Reform Bill passed 
by Sweden’s legislature in 2010.185 
While abandoning its commitment to remain neutral in any future conflict, 
Sweden has also become increasingly close to NATO since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
as described previously. Like Finland, Sweden has participated extensively in NATO 
peacekeeping operations and training exercises, and it is seemingly as close to the 
Alliance as is possible without being a member.186 Also like Finland, this cooperation 
with NATO has drastically increased since the Ukraine crisis began in late 2013.187 
The current political situation in Sweden is quite tense, especially regarding 
security and the question of NATO membership. Swedish politicians are clearly 
responding to Russia’s renewed aggression in the Baltic Sea region. This was evident in 
their decision in 2016 to remilitarize the strategically important island of Gotland after 
decades of leaving it defenseless.188 Swedish political parties are still split, however, on 
whether the nation should seek NATO membership. Although many parties are divided 
on the issue, even among themselves, currently only the socialist parties, including the 
current government, are against NATO membership, while all of the other parties openly 
support joining the Alliance.189 
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The Swedish people are similarly divided on the issue. A poll conducted in the 
summer of 2016 indicated that 33 percent of Swedes desire membership in the Alliance, 
while 49 percent do not, and a staggering 18 percent are undecided.190 These numbers 
represent an important change from a poll taken in September 2015, which, for the first 
time, indicated that a plurality of Swedes favored the Alliance, with 41 percent for 
membership, 39 percent against, and 20 percent undecided.191 According to the survey’s 
manager, Toivo Sjörén, one reason for the shift back to a slight plurality opposed to 
joining the Alliance may be the opposition of key Social Democrat politicians.192 Still, if 
one takes a longer-term view of the situation, it is clear that Swedish popular support for 
NATO membership is growing and that any increasing threats to European security from 
Russia might easily sway undecided Swedes in favor of membership. According to 
Robbie Gramer, the associate director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the 
Atlantic Council, the issue is “still very controversial… but the growing number of 
undecided people shows that a shift is taking place…. It’s a prelude to a prelude of 
NATO membership.”193 
There are, after all, many considerations that urge the Swedes to favor 
membership, including factors that are specific to Sweden. First among these is the 
relatively recent but striking realization that the Swedish armed forces, which have a long 
and proud history of being extremely adept and capable, are now completely insufficient 
to protect Swedish sovereignty on their own. Military spending cuts in the post–Cold War 
era had such an impact on the Swedish military that its then supreme commander, 
General Sverker Göransson, publically stated in December 2012 that Sweden could only 
resist for a week if attacked.194 This statement was later confirmed by a Swedish military 
college, which said that “the military does not have a credible ability to defend all of 
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Sweden” so it would be required to rely on international help.195 This judgment was 
reinforced again by a 2016 report commissioned by the Swedish government on the 
country’s security, which stated that Sweden “would be dependent on outside support to 
maintain its sovereignty in an evolving military crisis.”196 Additionally, this report stated 
that “EU cooperation will remain of limited importance for Sweden’s defence 
capabilities” and that “earlier ambitions among some of the Member States that, over 
time, the EU would take over NATO’s role in Europe have gradually been 
abandoned.”197 Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who himself 
hails from the Nordic region (a former prime minister of Denmark), stated unequivocally 
that Sweden cannot expect NATO’s help in a conflict unless it becomes a member. 
Considering that it would take at least three weeks for the U.S. to reinforce Sweden in a 
conflict, one can see why Swedes might be worried.198 
Still, there are many Sweden-specific opposing influences that help keep the 
country out of the Alliance. Left-leaning parties that oppose NATO membership typically 
argue that Sweden would have to forfeit some sovereignty to the Alliance and that 
Sweden would only be a minor player in NATO if it joined.199 A subset of this argument 
is that NATO would want to install nuclear weapons on Swedish soil, even though the 
cases of Denmark and Norway make clear that NATO would not have that authority.200  
What may be the most politically potent argument against membership, however, 
stems from the belief that Sweden avoided both world wars through neutrality and was 
able to maintain an advantageous position throughout the Cold War due to non-
alignment. Furthermore, during the Cold War Sweden secretly prepared to provide aid to 
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and receive help from NATO if a conflict broke out, and according to a noted professor at 
the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, Bo Hugemark, “the difference between 
then and now was primarily that now we talk out loud about it.”201 Consequently, many 
Swedes may feel that they do not need to fix what is not broken—non-alignment with the 
implied protection of NATO served them well during the Cold War, and it may serve 
them well in what many are calling the beginning of the Second Cold War. 
C. COMBINED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
In addition to Russia’s major aggressive moves in Georgia and Ukraine, Moscow 
has also sought to incite fear in Finland and Sweden by directly targeting them with 
unprecedented rhetoric, anti-Western diplomatic moves, and military posturing. Russian 
military aircraft have violated both countries’ airspace, and a Russian submarine was 
caught in Sweden’s coastal waterways in 2014.202 The Russian military presence in and 
above the Baltic Sea is higher now than at any point since the Cold War.203 Russia has 
scared these two Nordic countries with aggressive talk about nuclear weapons and made 
clear that, if they decide to join NATO, Russia will, according to Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov, “take all necessary military-technical measures” in 
retaliation.204 According to an article written jointly in 2016 by the prime ministers of 
Finland and Sweden, Juha Sipilä and Stefan Löfven, “Russia’s reprehensible actions 
against Ukraine” and increased “military activity in and around the Baltic Sea Region” 
face the Nordic neighbors “with the most serious threat against European security since 
the end of the Cold War.”205  
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Interestingly, Russia’s threats against these two Nordic neighbors tend to have a 
polarizing effect, pushing many Finns and Swedes to desire NATO membership all the 
more, while convincing others that membership is not worth causing an unpredictable but 
certainly negative response from Russia. It would appear that Swedes, who do not share a 
border with Russia, are more likely to be in the former category, while Finns are more 
likely to decide that NATO membership is not worth the risk. 
Indeed, this subtle difference in majority reactions to Russian threats by Swedes 
and Finns may play a large part in explaining why Swedes are more supportive of joining 
the Alliance than their Finnish neighbors. As a former Swedish ambassador to Russia, 
Tomas Bertelman, explains, while “some may actually see [Russian provocations] as a 
reminder of the dangers we might face if we challenge the Russians by becoming 
members of NATO… the large majority in Sweden obviously perceive it the other way 
around: it reminds them that being non-aligned means being undefined.”206 Annie Loof, 
the leader of the Center Party, responded to Lavrov’s words by saying that “our foreign 
and security policy is decided by Sweden, not by Russian threats.”207 
An analysis of Finnish sources and commentaries, however, reveals a more 
cautious approach to handling Russian threats than that in Sweden. One such example 
comes from Aaltola, who explains that “Finns don’t usually speculate about the 
possibility of war, but in the case of NATO membership they fear Russia’s reaction could 
be disastrous.”208 This more pessimistic reaction is associated with the belief that Russia 
would more harshly oppose Finland’s accession to NATO than Sweden’s. Moreover, 
Finland is far more vulnerable than Sweden to trade restrictions from Russia.209 
Furthermore, Finland survived the Cold War largely by maintaining a positive bilateral 
relationship with Russia, and this would likely be lost if Finland joined the Alliance. The 
Finnish government’s report also speculated that Russia might attempt to “politically 
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activate the ethnic Russians living in Finland” in response to NATO membership talks 
and noted that “during the accession process the atmosphere would be poisoned.”210 
There are certainly many Finns who poke holes in this reaction, however. 
According to the same government report, “Norway’s ability as a NATO member to 
sustain a similar ‘Russian agenda’ points to the reversibility of such a state of affairs,” an 
observation which leaves room for hope of recovering any lost relationship with 
Russia.211 Timo Soini, the leader of the Finns party, points out a fault with the idea that 
Finland should avoid NATO membership in order to escape repercussions from Russia: 
“when times are bad it is not the right time and when times are good there is no reason to 
join [NATO].”212 Furthermore, President Niinistö stated in January 2017 that sanctions 
against Russia will not be ended until Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine are reversed.213 
These sanctions continue to sour relations between Helsinki and Moscow, leading one to 
wonder how much fear Finnish politicians still have of poor relations with Russia.  
Although the exact Russian response if Finland or Sweden joined the Alliance is 
impossible to predict, many experts have identified a pattern in Russian responses to 
NATO enlargement that may hold true if NATO expanded in the Nordic region. 
According to both Finnish and Swedish government reports issued in 2016, this pattern 
includes three steps. First, Russia opposes the enlargement using diplomatic and 
economic pressure, and then Moscow accepts the fact that the enlargement has taken 
place before finally allowing things to return to the status quo ante.214 Both reports also 
suggested that Russia would not dare engage in military aggression against either country 
if they joined NATO, since this action would trigger an Article 5 response from the 
whole Alliance.215 
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Although the same hesitation to start an open conflict with NATO will also likely 
prevent Putin from attacking the Baltic states, fear of this possibility acts as a strong force 
that pushes both Finland and Sweden closer to joining NATO. Indeed, members of the 
Nordic community widely agree that a relatively near-term crisis in the Baltic Sea region 
is completely possible.216 Experts believe that it would take Russia’s military only a 
matter of days to take control of the Baltic states, and recapturing them would be a 
difficult task for NATO. This is due to Russia’s buildup of Anti-Access Area Denial 
assets in the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, which would make it difficult to reinforce 
the Baltic states by land or air. Access to Finnish and especially Swedish territory and 
waters would allow the circumvention of these Russian assets, greatly enhancing 
NATO’s ability to protect the Baltic states. Many scholars, both within the Nordic region 
and outside, argue that Finland and Sweden are in fact the keys to NATO’s defense of the 
region.217 The island of Gotland would play a particularly important role in this situation, 
and both the Russian and NATO forces would desire access to the island. According to 
the Swedish government’s report, in addition to other analyses, Gotland’s importance 
would be so great that Sweden would certainly be drawn into any crisis in the region 
whether a member of NATO or not.218 Finland’s chief of defense, General Jarmo 
Lindberg, agrees with this analysis, stating in January 2017 that “any large-scale 
operation” in the region by Russia would necessarily involve Finland and Sweden.219 
Furthermore, even if they were not forced into the fray by outside action, Finland and 
Sweden have vowed to protect their Baltic neighbors, and following through on this 
promise would not only be diplomatically important but strategically crucial as well.220 
Consequently, Russian threats of aggression in the Baltic region give Finland and 
Sweden one more reason to make the leap to NATO membership, since doing so would 
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further deter Russian action in the region and allow the Alliance to better protect the 
Baltic states if a crisis did emerge. 
Additionally, Finland’s and Sweden’s already extraordinarily close ties to NATO 
create a paradox that may be problematic for the countries. Russia may already view 
these countries in the same way that they view NATO Allies, which could lead Moscow 
to preemptively target these two Nordic countries as part of any attack against NATO. 
Thus, Helsinki and Stockholm may be viewed as NATO Allies already without actually 
benefitting from any of the collective defense guarantees or deterrence measures that 
come from a subscription to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.221  
Adding to the pro-NATO argument in Finland and Sweden, Brexit will likely 
push both Finland and Sweden closer to joining the Alliance, and possibly even over the 
line and into the Alliance. François Heisbourg, a French security expert and chairman of 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, argued last year that Brexit will weaken 
the EU’s mutual defense capabilities so much that any Finns or Swedes who argue that 
EU protection is adequate will no longer be able to do so.222 Consequently, it is likely 
that the countries will see a greater need for NATO protection after the United Kingdom 
leaves the EU.223 
This effect may be magnified by the rise of Donald Trump to the presidency of 
the United States. Although there are arguments on both sides of the issue, Trump’s 
presidency may push Finland and Sweden closer to joining NATO than ever before. Due 
to the shortfalls of the other security arrangements already discussed, one of the Nordic 
neighbors’ primary strategic objectives remains to keep the United States engaged in the 
security of Europe.224 This relationship with the United States is now in question for 
policy makers in both countries. General Lindberg recently described Trump’s election as 
one of the two biggest “security policy risks of Europe,” right next to the “aggressive 
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power politics” of Russian president Putin.225 From his perspective, “Trump is obviously 
not particularly interested in protecting Europe against the threat of Russia.”226 Similarly, 
Hans Wallmark, the defense spokesman for the frontrunners in the next Swedish election, 
the Moderates, fears that bilateral security guarantees with the United States will be 
weakened under Trump, so “it’s better that we seek the strength in cooperating with 28 
[NATO] countries rather in just one nation.”227 In this way Finland and Sweden can 
receive security guarantees not just from the United States, but from Canada and all 
European NATO powers, including the nuclear deterrence provided by the United 
Kingdom and France. This benefit will be even more pertinent once the United Kingdom 
leaves the EU, since any hope of British protection will then only be found under NATO 
auspices. Lastly, it would be far easier for Trump to abandon bilateral security 
arrangements with Finland or Sweden than to abandon NATO, so these two Nordic states 
may see another reason to join the Alliance—to solidify their transatlantic commitments.  
On the other hand, Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström recently argued 
that the uncertainty about U.S. policy regarding NATO and European security more 
generally brought by President Trump makes it an especially poor time to discuss joining 
the Alliance: “The idea that Sweden would become safer by abandoning our non-
alignment in a situation of utmost uncertainty is absurd.”228 In a separate interview with 
the New York Times, Wallström explained that Sweden will maintain the status quo 
“especially now, when we don’t know what will happen with NATO with the new 
commander in chief in the United States… There’s a lot of uncertainty. We don’t know 
what Trump will do with NATO.”229 Perhaps this uncertainty will be alleviated, 
however, after Trump’s February 2017 address to Congress, in which he said that U.S. 
“foreign policy calls for a direct, robust and meaningful engagement with the world. It 
                                                 
225 Lindberg quoted in “Finnish Defence Chief Views Prospects for Conflict in Baltic.” 
226 Ibid. 
227 Richard Milne, “Sweden’s Debate about NATO Intensifies after U.S. Election,” Financial Times, 
November 22, 2016. 
228 Margot Wallström, “Sweden Will Continue to Play Its Part in Security,” Financial Times, 
December 5, 2016. 
229 Somini Sengupta, “Diplomat Talks about Standing Up to Trump,” New York Times, December 20, 
2016. 
 55 
is American leadership based on vital security interests that we share with our allies all 
across the globe. We strongly support NATO.”230 This reassurance about NATO’s 
future may serve to dismantle the anti-NATO argument posed by Wallström while 
doing nothing to weaken the argument that Trump may not renew bilateral security 
agreements with Finland and Sweden—accords that he may not view as fair or beneficial 
to Americans. The outcome may be a net-positive for the pro-NATO bloc in both 
countries. 
Finnish and Swedish governments have recently and repeatedly assured each 
other that they will not surprise the other with an offer to join NATO. Both countries 
joined the EU at the same time, and it has been widely believed that they would either 
join NATO together or not join at all. The conventional wisdom has been that joining 
together would be the wisest course, since if Finland joined alone it would be a NATO 
outpost that would be difficult to defend, and that, if Sweden joined alone, Finland would 
be more vulnerable than it currently is and Stockholm would be faced once again with the 
“Finland question.”231  
Recently, however, some Swedes have challenged this traditional thinking and 
have argued that it is now time for Sweden to join NATO whether Finland joins or not. 
Swedish commentator Mats Johansson recently argued in the popular Swedish newspaper 
Svenska Dagbladet that “Sweden should wish Finland well on the road it has chosen, and 
Sweden should develop its defense simply minding its own interests.”232 Many experts 
even argue that if the pro-NATO non-Socialist Alliance regains control in the next 
Swedish election, which it is currently favored to do, it may quickly decide to seek 
membership regardless of the Finnish position.233 If this comes to fruition, it may act as 
the locomotive that drives not only Sweden to seek NATO membership but Finland as 
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well. After all, if Swedish politicians notify their Finnish counterparts that Sweden is 
going to join the Alliance, then majority opinion among Finnish politicians may be tipped 
in favor of joining the Alliance as well. This change in thinking among politicians, 
according to polls, would likely result in the Finnish people supporting NATO accession 
as well. Finnish support for membership would, in turn, further strengthen Swedish 
resolve to join the Alliance, and referenda could pass in both countries. Such is the 
symbiotic relationship between the two peoples and governments. 
Conversely, opponents of NATO membership in Sweden hope that Finnish 
reluctance to join NATO for the time being will prevent Sweden from joining as well.234 
Thus, it appears that within the close relationship between Finland and Sweden, the 
former has emerged as a force that keeps the two states non-aligned while the latter is 
increasingly pushing the duo towards NATO membership. If this dynamic continues, 
which force will win out? Unless there is a fundamental change in the NATO debate in 
either country, the ball appears to be in Sweden’s court. Swedish politicians will either 
try to join NATO, or they will wait for Finland to be ready first. 
For the time being, however, it is unlikely that either country will seek NATO 
membership. In a joint statement in 2016 Prime Ministers Sipilä and Löfven said that 
they “believe military non-alignment serves us well.”235 Barring any major international 
events, this is likely to be the continuing policy, at least until Sweden elects a new 
Parliament in 2018 and Finland follows in 2019.  
In the meantime, Finland and Sweden are seeking increased cooperation with 
their Nordic neighbors and with the Baltic states. According to Swedish Foreign Minister 
Margot Wallström, such cooperation has “already deepened a lot” since the election of 
Donald Trump.236 In addition to the U.S. election, Brexit has caused uncertainty in the 
region that is driving increased cooperation among Nordic and Baltic states.237 Sweden 
and Norway recently announced increased cooperation in protecting Baltic sea lanes and 
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ports, and there has been increased activity within the Nordic Defense Cooperation 
(NORDEFCO) in recent years.238 While this trend may continue, neither Nordic nor 
Baltic unity is seen as a means of replacing the security guarantees provided by NATO. 
Nordic officials do not believe that they have the power necessary to deter or defend 
against an outside attack.239 Thus, the question of NATO membership will remain for 
Finland and Sweden regardless of how close the countries in the region become. 
D. CONCLUSION 
There appear to be only a few paths that may lead to NATO membership for 
Finland or Sweden in the next decade or so. The first, as previously described, is if the 
non-Socialist Alliance returns to power in Sweden and argues for membership, which 
may in turn lead to Finnish membership as well. The second path would arise if Russia 
created a crisis in the Baltic region similar to the one it provoked in Ukraine. This would 
hit closer to home for Finland and Sweden and would likely push them into the 
Alliance.240 The third scenario would unfold if Finland or Sweden were brought into a 
conflict against Russia, whether by fulfilling their EU security obligations or by being 
attacked themselves (either militarily or by Russian hybrid warfare tactics). Fearing for 
their own security, and with little to lose, these two Nordic neighbors would likely seek 
protection from NATO.  
Finland and Sweden both take their national security seriously, and their policies 
of political-military non-alignment have been at the center of their national security 
policies for generations. They will not change these policies lightly. In their joint article 
the countries’ prime ministers explained that they “do not believe in rapid policy changes 
in security policy—they are especially poorly suited to matters that concern our 
countries’ security. Finland and Sweden drive their security policy with a long-term 
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perspective.”241 Thus, major changes must occur to precipitate any security policy 
changes in these two countries. Although there are a great number of factors pushing the 
countries towards seeking NATO membership, there are also powerful influences 
keeping them from this decision. Unsurprisingly, scholars are split between which 
powers will win out in the near future, with authors such as Andrew Wolff arguing that 
they may soon join, and others like Jannicke Fiskvik suggesting that this is unlikely.242 
Insider politicians are equally unsure. Sweden’s former Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, 
predicted in 2016 that “in ten years it is highly likely that Sweden and Finland will be 
members,” but many other elite experts believe the exact opposite.243 In the end, no one 
can be certain. That said, the Norwegian Daily argued last year that “Sweden and Finland 
belong in the alliance, together with Iceland, Denmark, and Norway” because “NATO is 
not just a military association; it is also a community of values,” and it is for this reason 
that it seems highly unlikely that Finland and Sweden will remain out of the Alliance 
forever.244 
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V. PROSPECTS OF NATO ACCEPTANCE 
In order for Finland and Sweden to finally join NATO, two sets of decisions need 
to be made: the Nordic neighbors need to decide to join the Alliance, and the Allies need 
to unanimously decide to accept the new countries. While prior sections of this thesis 
have addressed questions regarding the former decision, this section aims to assess the 
prospects for decisions by others to welcome Finland and Sweden into NATO. To do 
this, likely choices in the most influential NATO members will be analyzed in the 
greatest depth, namely France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. The primary research question to be addressed, then, is whether these countries 
would accept Finland and Sweden into the Alliance if they requested membership. Since 
governments change relatively frequently, and politicians rarely address this question 
directly, a variety of types of supporting evidence will be used to answer it, such as 
analyzing levels of cooperation between Finland and Sweden and the Allies, and looking 
at the factors that may or may not make Finland and Sweden suitable Allies. Ultimately, 
it will be argued that the NATO Allies would in current circumstances probably welcome 
these countries into the Alliance with open arms, but that this judgment is subject to 
change even in the near future due to the unpredictability of decision-makers such as 
Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. 
The support of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom for the accession 
of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance is crucial, since it is impossible for these Nordic 
countries to join without unanimous support from all NATO members.245 Furthermore, 
as some of the most powerful members of the Alliance, France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States could potentially sway lesser powers to either 
support or not support another round of NATO enlargement encompassing Finland and 
Sweden. Consequently, the research question asking if these existing NATO members 
would support an enlargement of the Alliance to include Finland and Sweden is an 
important and timely one. As Russia emerges as an increasingly aggressive revisionist 
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power, the likelihood of Finland and Sweden seeking protection under the NATO defense 
umbrella increases, and thus the importance of this research increases as well. 
This chapter discusses the factors that could make Finland and Sweden either 
good or bad candidates for membership before reviewing the experience that Finland and 
Sweden have in cooperating with the Allies in a joint context. The chapter then analyzes 
the research questions as they apply to France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. An overall comparative analysis and conclusions complete the chapter.  
Analyzing the potential membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO from the 
Alliance’s perspective reveals far more benefits than disadvantages. Indeed, the Nordic 
countries are often described as “the best, most active and compatible, and in that sense 
the most appealing” prospective NATO Allies in the world.246 This is largely because 
these Nordic countries are viewed as well-developed Western countries with positive 
records as participants in NATO’s PfP and as members of the EU.247 From an ideological 
standpoint, Finland and Sweden have long operated as successful democracies that 
routinely earn praise from independent organizations such as the CATO Institute and 
Freedom House for their high levels of freedom and transparency.248 Culturally, 
politically, and ideologically they are far more similar to most NATO Allies than certain 
recent additions to the Alliance. 
Furthermore, realist observers in NATO member states can find plenty of reasons 
why Finland and Sweden would be good additions due to the military advantages that 
they would bring the Alliance. The most important such advantage, which was discussed 
in more detail in Chapter IV, is the geostrategic positioning that Finland and Sweden 
would provide the Alliance in order to help deter (or counter) a Russian attack on the 
Baltic states. Indeed, many experts believe that NATO access to Finnish and Swedish 
territory is the key to defending the Baltics. Furthermore, since a failure to deter a 
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Russian attack on the Baltic states would trigger a NATO response under Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, it is widely agreed that the Baltic states are now the most likely place 
in the world that a Third World War might start.249 Consequently, adding Finland and 
Sweden to NATO’s roster would serve to accomplish one of the Alliance’s most 
important goals at the moment: increasing the deterrent against a Russian attack on the 
Baltic states. Apart from the benefits that access to their territory would provide NATO 
in this regard, Finland and Sweden have also greatly increased their involvement in 
patrolling the Baltic Sea and in conducting military exercises in the region.250 Their 
resulting expertise and experience in the region would be quite valuable to the Alliance. 
Additionally, far from adding a new region that NATO would be required to 
protect, Finland and Sweden joining NATO would consolidate the Nordic and Baltic 
regions into a common strategic space that would be easier to defend.251 Since Denmark 
and Norway are already in the Alliance, NATO must already consider how to defend the 
Nordic region to which Finland and Sweden belong. Thus, defending a new region would 
not be added to NATO’s plate, but it would rather be far easier to defend both the Nordic 
and Baltic regions. Furthermore, as explained by scholar Andrew Wolff of Dickinson 
College, “Finnish and Swedish admission would also bolster NATO’s strategy in the 
Arctic, which is an area of future economic and geostrategic competition between the 
West and Russia.”252 
Finland and Sweden also have expertise in several areas outside the Baltic states 
that would be beneficial to the Alliance. Finland’s geography lends it the unique ability to 
monitor a large portion of Russia’s Eastern border, and the country’s natural knowledge 
of the landscape in the region could prove useful in any future conflict with Russia.253 
Furthermore, cyber defense is a warfare domain that is increasingly vital when dealing 
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with Russia, and it happens to be an area of expertise for both Finland and Sweden.254 
The same can be said of the Nordic countries regarding the hybrid warfare tactics 
employed by Russia in Ukraine and elsewhere. These methods have long been a 
foundation of Finnish and Swedish territorial defense.255 
Additionally, Finland and Sweden have militaries that already completely meet 
NATO standards and are consistent with the Alliance’s operating procedures, even 
exceeding the level of compatibility attained by some newly accepted NATO 
members.256 Furthermore, both countries are viewed as overall security providers that 
take their national defense requirements seriously and that would contribute to NATO’s 
collective defense.257 In fact, Sweden even helped the Baltic states meet NATO 
membership requirements by supplying them weapons and assisting with the expansion 
of their defense forces.258 The integration of the countries’ air defenses would be 
particularly advantageous for the Alliance, as they would greatly aid in protecting the 
Baltic Sea region as a whole.259  
The Finnish and Swedish militaries are only set to get stronger in the short and 
medium term as well. As discussed in Chapter IV, Russian aggression has caused both 
countries’ governments to recently announce plans to expand their military capabilities, 
making them only more desirable as Allies in the near future.260 
An additional reason why Allies would likely accept Finland and Sweden into 
NATO can be found in their existing EU memberships. As signatories to the EU’s Treaty 
of Lisbon, the 22 members of NATO that are also members of the EU are already 
obligated to provide aid to Finland and Sweden if they were to be attacked, as outlined in 
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Article 42 (7) of the Treaty of the European Union. Furthermore, if the majority of EU 
member states came under attack, it is hard to imagine that the United States would not 
come to their aid. Thus, in virtually any realistic scenario that might occur, the major 
players in NATO are already legally or politically obligated to help defend Finland and 
Sweden, so their addition to the Alliance as members would not be a complete change 
from the current situation. In addition to this, their membership in the EU speaks to how 
close they are politically with major NATO players like France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom.261 
While Finland and Sweden clearly have plenty to offer that would benefit the 
Alliance, their membership would also cause few internal problems for NATO.262 Their 
membership would improve EU-NATO cooperation, and it would by all accounts be 
technically straightforward and pose few practical difficulties.263 Finland and Sweden 
have reached such a high level of interoperability with NATO that joining the Alliance 
would in most respects be an administrative change; even joining NATO’s command 
structure would be an easy task for NATO and these two Nordic countries to 
accomplish.264  
Lastly, if the NATO Allies decided to endorse Finnish and Swedish membership 
in the Alliance, they would thereby deal a significant blow to Russian foreign policy. As 
noted in Chapter IV, Moscow has repeatedly gone to great lengths to prevent a Nordic 
expansion of NATO and clearly views the prospect of Finnish and Swedish NATO 
membership as a threat to its foreign policy goals. Thus, NATO expansion in the Nordic 
region would signal a failure of the Russian aggressive threats and warnings that have 
been aimed at scaring Finland and Sweden into maintaining their policies of military non-
alignment; this would in turn be a victory for the Alliance.265  
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While there are clearly plenty of reasons why NATO members might want to 
accept Finnish and Swedish membership applications, there are also reasons why they 
might not. The first of these to be discussed has already been laid out from the Finnish 
and Swedish perspectives in Chapter IV—that is, that accepting the countries into the 
Alliance could trigger a negative and largely unpredictable response from Russia. This 
reaction would be drawn out over the likely lengthy process of Finland and Sweden 
conducting referenda or approving legislation on the issue in their respective countries 
and in order to join the Alliance.266 The Russian response would likely be the same to 
NATO expansion in the Nordic region as it was to expansion elsewhere, which means 
that tensions would eventually die down and relations between NATO and Russia would 
return to normal.  
Additionally, however, Finland’s accession to NATO membership would 
effectively double NATO’s border with Russia, thereby increasing Russia’s ability to 
attack a NATO member without having to go through a buffer state first. This could 
potentially play a part in any intra-NATO debate on accepting Finnish membership, but 
the argument is hampered significantly by the likelihood that NATO members would 
have to go to Finland’s aid whether it is in the Alliance or not. Thus, because Finland’s 
border with Russia is already the EU’s border, it would apparently make little difference 
for most NATO members if the Alliance took responsibility for this border as well. 
Indeed, EU states such as France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom could make 
the argument that NATO adopting this border as well would be beneficial to them, since 
then it would not only be the EU and Finland defending it but Canada and the United 
States as well. 
Although slightly counter-intuitive, it could also be argued that Finland and 
especially Sweden could help NATO more right now outside the Alliance than inside it. 
One reason for this is that as long as the two Nordic countries are not Allies, they do not 
represent the Alliance and can thereby take a more vigorous stance toward Russia 
without risking a major war. This autonomy has allowed the countries to regularly 
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challenge Russia in a variety of ways, such as the 2015 incident when Finland dropped 
depth charges on a suspected Russian submarine in Finnish waters.267  
An additional way that Finland and Sweden may be more advantageous to NATO 
outside the Alliance is that membership would mean that they could no longer deter 
Russian aggression simply by holding their possible membership over Moscow. As has 
been noted, Putin has made it clear that he does not want Finland or Sweden to join 
NATO, which in turn may make him consider whether any aggressive actions he takes 
will finally push the countries into the Alliance. If Finland and Sweden joined, however, 
this calculus would be gone, and Putin might feel freer to make aggressive moves in 
Ukraine or elsewhere. NATO has recognized this possibility, and the think-tank RAND 
has even urged the United States to use the issue of possible Finnish and Swedish 
membership in the Alliance against Moscow. A 2016 RAND report argues that “NATO 
membership in the medium term is possible [for Finland and Sweden], and that 
possibility should be made clear to Russia and leveraged as an additional deterrent 
against Russian aggression.”268 Thus, there are legitimate reasons why NATO Allies may 
desire to postpone Finnish and Swedish membership indefinitely. 
Another way to analyze the likely response of key NATO Allies to a membership 
application from Finland and Sweden is to look at the extent to which the countries 
involved have worked together in a joint military context. The Nordic countries have 
been substantially involved in NATO and EU operations and training exercises that have 
involved most if not all of the most influential NATO Allies—France, Germany, Italy, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. This participation has led to the familiarity of 
the Allies with the political and military institutions of Finland and Sweden, and it could 
certainly make the Allies more comfortable with the idea of new NATO members in the 
Nordic region. Furthermore, that Finland and Sweden have been accepted as participants 
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and often even hosts of these exercises shows the value that NATO already places on 
deepening its partnerships with these Nordic neighbors.  
Perhaps the most important of these interactions have been the participation of 
Finnish and Swedish militaries in combat operations led by EU or NATO forces, since 
this participation shows the Nordic countries’ willingness to commit military resources 
for foreign policy goals. Since NATO membership requires countries to be willing to 
send their militaries to defend other Allies in the event of an attack, the demonstrated 
willingness by Finland and Sweden to militarily support foreign interventions for non-
Article 5 purposes will greatly help their case for membership if they decide to apply in 
the future. 
Examples of such operations that Finland and Sweden have recently participated 
in are many. In 1996 both countries sent several hundred soldiers to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
to join NATO’s Stabilization Force, and these two countries have continued contributing 
troops to NATO’s Kosovo Force ever since it began in 1999.269 At the peak of operations 
in Kosovo, Finland deployed over 900 soldiers, and Sweden sent over 1,000; Finland 
even became the first non-NATO member to lead one of the three regional multinational 
task forces of KFOR.270 Both countries also joined the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in 2002, well before it became a NATO-led operation. In ISAF operations, 
Sweden became the only non-NATO European country to lead a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, and both countries maintained hundreds of troops 
in the country under ISAF auspices.271 Finnish and Swedish troops remain in 
Afghanistan even today as part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission, and in 2015 
Sweden committed to continue supporting Afghanistan through 2024.272  
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In addition to these major NATO-led operations, both countries have long been 
and are still active participants in EU-led military operations in Africa and antipiracy 
operations near Somalia. Furthermore, Finland is the leading country for the EU’s 
Maritime Surveillance project, in which France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
all participate.273 
Finland and Sweden have also routinely participated in multinational training 
exercises with key NATO members, further enhancing their relationships. Finnish and 
Swedish participation in the annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) exercise has increased 
since the 1990s to the point that the countries are now central to the exercise and 
participate more than almost any other country. Sweden hosted the NATO exercise in 
2014, Swedish territory was used again in 2015, and both Finland and Sweden hosted the 
event in 2016. Finland and Sweden were also the only countries other than the United 
States to provide troops for a landing force in 2015, and during BALTOPS 2016 marines 
from Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United States all landed on a Finnish 
beach together as part of the exercise.274 Through this annual exercise alone, Finland and 
Sweden have over a decade’s worth of experience in training alongside key NATO 
Allies. 
The largest recent NATO exercise, however, was Trident Juncture 2015, which 
involved around 36,000 people from 30 countries, including Finland, Sweden, and 27 
NATO Allies.275 While Finnish and Swedish participation in this exercise was strong, 
involving multiple ships, squadrons of aircraft, and large numbers of special forces 
personnel, the 2018 iteration of the event is being hosted by their Nordic neighbor 
Norway and will be driven by a scenario that involves the region heavily. Consequently, 
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Finland and Sweden have accepted NATO’s invitation to help plan the event, and both 
countries plan to participate heavily in it.276 
Furthermore, Finland and Sweden have joined forces with Norway to host Arctic 
Challenge Exercises (ACE) every other year since 2013. These events are designed to 
enhance the joint operational capabilities of participating air forces, and they have grown 
since 2013 to involve over a hundred aircraft from key Allies such as France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Even more NATO members will participate 
in ACE 2017, and as with the others before, the event will take place primarily in 
Lapland—an area in the north of the host countries.277 This event adds further prestige 
and credibility to Finland and Sweden as dutiful NATO partners and potential future 
Allies. 
In addition to the mutual trust and understanding that Finland and Sweden have 
built with NATO Allies by cooperating with them in large joint operations and exercises, 
evidence that France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States would 
probably accept them as NATO Allies can be found in the frequent bilateral cooperation 
that occurs between the states involved. 
 France, for example, found that it could rely on Finnish and Swedish help in its 
hour of need after Paris invoked the EU’s mutual defense clause in the aftermath of a 
terrorist attack in 2015. Due to the structure of the EU, triggering this clause led France to 
enter bilateral negotiations with each of the 27 other EU member states in order to 
discuss what aid they were willing to provide. Finland and Sweden were willing to help 
as much as it was possible for them to: for Sweden this meant anything up to and 
including supplying military support for the French military or police, while “Finland 
declared on Tuesday [17 November 2015] that the country is not able to give France 
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military assistance, but other kinds of assistance.”278 Apart from the likely feeling in 
Paris that the French now owe the Nordic countries a debt of gratitude, the Finns and 
Swedes have now shown France that they take their EU security commitments seriously 
and are willing to take action—precisely what is expected of potential NATO Allies. 
Consequently, France will likely accept any future Finnish or Swedish applications for 
NATO membership. 
The relationships that Germany has with Finland and Sweden are perhaps even 
more solid than those that France has with the countries. Germany has long historic ties 
to both Finland and Sweden, and their relationships have been quite positive in the last 
century. As discussed in Chapter III, both countries had mutually supportive relationships 
with Germany in both World Wars, and such friendly relations continue to the present 
day. While most of their large governmental interactions take place in multinational 
contexts that have already been discussed, there are some bilateral cases that show a 
German willingness to work alongside these Nordic countries. For example, in 2006 
Finnish and German forces held exercises together in order to prepare the two militaries 
for their joint EU Rapid Reaction Battle Group deployment in 2007.279 Furthermore, the 
political closeness of Germany and Sweden allowed the two governments to create a 
partnership in January 2017 that aims to develop electrified road technology, among 
other things.280 The two governments also work closely within the EU, even joining 
forces to start an initiative in the European Defense Agency to increase cooperation 
between all EU members.281 Given Germany’s historic and current close ties with 
Finland and Sweden, as well as Germany’s cultural, ethnic, and geographic closeness to 
the Nordic region, it would be surprising if the Germans did not welcome the Finns and 
the Swedes into the Alliance with open arms. 
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Italy, on the other hand, has much less in common with Finland and Sweden, and 
deals with them much less frequently on a bilateral basis. All three countries are in the 
EU, however, and are therefore familiar with each other’s politics and institutions. 
Furthermore, as previously noted, the countries have all cooperated extensively in joint 
contexts within NATO, the EU, and even the UN. While there is not the overwhelming 
evidence that Italy would accept Finland and Sweden into the Alliance that there is for 
other countries, there is also no evidence that suggests Italy would reject Finnish and 
Swedish applications. As a second tier power that does not often go against the grain, 
Italy would most likely follow more powerful NATO Allies’ decisions and accept the 
countries into the Alliance. 
For its part, the United Kingdom has long been a proponent of Finnish and 
Swedish membership in NATO. During the Cold War, the United Kingdom extended 
Sweden assurances that London would come to Sweden’s aid if a conflict erupted. In 
exchange, Sweden provided NATO with intelligence, fortified landing strips to 
accommodate large NATO bombers, adopted NATO fuel nozzles, and at one point even 
put the UK in charge of all Swedish military planning.282 This close cooperation has 
continued in the post–Cold War era. In 2001, British aircraft became the first within 
NATO to participate in a joint air exercise over Finland.283 Furthermore, the British 
signed defense protocols that set the stage for even closer military cooperation with 
Finland and Sweden in 2016 and 2014, respectively.284 Such signals, along with the long 
British history of trying to help Finland and Sweden within multinational frameworks, 
make it clear that the UK would likely accept the countries into the Alliance. 
Similarly, bilateral relations between the United States and Finland and Sweden 
have long suggested that the United States would support their NATO membership. Like 
the United Kingdom, the United States gave Sweden secret military assurances during the 
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Cold War after failing to get Sweden to join the Alliance as a founding member. Mutual 
interests discussed previously in this chapter have caused American bilateral relationships 
with Finland and Sweden to grow rapidly recently: the countries’ militaries have become 
intertwined through arms sales, sharing military components, and officer exchange 
programs; frameworks for increased bilateral cooperation with the United States were 
signed by both countries in 2016.285 The election of Donald Trump, however, has called 
the future of these relationships into question, and has even made the U.S. acceptance of 
Finnish or Swedish membership applications debatable. Alex Stubb, a former Finnish 
prime minister, recently expressed concern that Trump might strike a deal with Putin to 
stop NATO enlargement, and Hans Wallmark, a defense spokesman in Sweden, recently 
agreed that Trump’s rise to power makes Swedish acceptance into NATO “a more open 
question.”286 As of this writing, there does not appear to be any definitive evidence as to 
what stance Trump will take regarding NATO expansion, but he has recently disavowed 
his anti-NATO rhetoric and reconfirmed U.S. obligations to the Alliance, so it does not 
appear that he is significantly changing the U.S. position regarding NATO as a whole. 
Looking at potential Finnish and Swedish NATO membership from a comparative 
standpoint, there are reasons to argue that Sweden would be a more desirable member 
than Finland from the Alliance’s perspective. NATO itself has not indicated that it views 
the countries differently, but Sweden is a larger country, with more resources for defense, 
and does not have a direct border with Russia, thus making it easier to defend.287 
Furthermore, if Sweden joined without Finland, there would be little issue for the 
Alliance except for potentially increasing the external danger to Finland from Russia. 
Conversely, if Finland joined NATO without Sweden, it would be logistically difficult 
for the Alliance to defend Finland without access to Swedish territory.288 Thus, there is 
reason to contend that NATO might accept a solitary Swedish application, but perhaps 
not a Finnish one. 
                                                 
285 “Security in a New Era,” 5–6; “Finland Beefs Up Military”; Michel, “Finland, Sweden, and 
NATO,” 5–6, 12.  
286 Milne, “Sweden’s Debate about NATO Intensifies.” 
287 “Finland, Sweden Move Together.” 
288 Bergquist et al., “The Effects,” 6, 39. 
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In the end, the vast array of benefits that NATO would gain by welcoming both 
Finland and Sweden into the Alliance makes their acceptance the most likely outcome if 
they were to apply for membership. While politicians in key NATO member 
governments do not typically publically announce positions regarding Alliance 
membership for Finland and Sweden, leaders in Helsinki and Stockholm, who are privy 
to more private declarations of foreign policies, clearly believe that they would be 
accepted into the Alliance if they were to apply. If they did not believe this, they would 
not bank their countries’ national security policies on the ability to join NATO at the last 
minute if necessary, as has been discussed in Chapter IV.289 Paradoxically, then, if key 
Allies such as France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, or the United States changed 
course and decided that they might not be willing to approve future membership 
applications from Finland or Sweden, that might cause these two Nordic countries to 
want to join the Alliance after all.  
                                                 
289 “Finnish President Keeps NATO Membership Door Open, Urges Dialogue with Russia,” BBC 
Monitoring European, July 5, 2016, ProQuest document ID 1801549262. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Although prior to the Second World War the Nordic countries of Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden all trusted in neutrality to keep them out of conflicts, the 
aftermath of the war caused each state to reevaluate the efficacy and appropriateness of 
this policy. In doing so, Denmark and Norway found themselves in similar domestic 
positions to each other, but in very different situations than their Nordic neighbors 
Finland and Sweden. Comparatively, Denmark and Norway were far weaker financially 
and militarily and, having suffered defeat in the war, less trusting in neutrality than 
Sweden after the war. Most Swedes credited the policy with keeping Sweden mostly out 
of the war, and the country retained a strong military. While Finland’s armed forces had 
not been destroyed in the war, the country was stuck with a harsh treaty that forced it to 
pay heavy reparations to the Soviets, forfeit much of its land, and allow a Soviet military 
base to be positioned just outside Helsinki. Consequently, Finland had completely lost 
trust that the West would come to its aid against the Soviets.  
As a result of their distinct experiences, neighbors, and locations, the Nordic 
countries reacted to Soviet pressure after the war differently. Moscow’s pressure pushed 
Norway even closer to the West, while it had almost no effect on Sweden’s actions. 
Denmark felt comparatively little Soviet pressure after the Red Army left the Danish 
island of Bornholm in 1946. These differing reactions and levels of pressure led to an 
impasse in negotiations for the proposed Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU), since 
Norway wanted it linked to the West, Sweden wanted a neutral SDU, and Denmark just 
wanted the negotiations to succeed. Once the SDU talks failed, Denmark saw no 
satisfactory alternative but to join Norway in signing on as a NATO Ally, while Sweden 
held faith in non-alignment backed by its strong military. Finnish President Paasikivi saw 
only one response to Soviet pressure that would leave Finnish sovereignty intact, and that 
was to appease the Soviets by signing a Finnish-Soviet pact in 1948 that guaranteed 
Finnish neutrality from both the Soviet Union and NATO.  
While Denmark and Norway have generally not expressed any regret about 
abandoning non-alignment in favor of NATO membership, Finland and Sweden have had 
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no significant reason to think they would have been better off joining NATO. Indeed, the 
Finnish and Swedish political blocs that argue for continued non-alignment today have 
plenty of reasons to argue that the policy served them well throughout the Cold War and 
beyond. While the apparent success of non-alignment since the Second World War may 
cause many in these two countries to cling to the policy, there is no reason to think that 
NATO membership would not have served Sweden just as well after the war, as it did for 
Denmark and Norway. Furthermore, as discussed in this thesis, neutrality failed to keep 
Finland out of the Winter War or the Second World War, and even Sweden was forced to 
partially abandon neutrality during the war in order to avoid provoking Berlin. 
Consequently, both countries have experienced the failures of the policy in the past and 
have reasons not to fully trust it in the future.  
While Soviet aggression did not push Finland or Sweden into NATO at the start 
of the Cold War, regional geopolitics have changed to such an extent that the new round 
of Russian aggression and apparent expansionism may finally do so. At a minimum, 
recent Russian actions have pushed the Nordic countries to work more closely together 
under Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and renewed the NATO membership 
debates within the Finnish and Swedish governments and societies.  
Given that, according to the research presented in this thesis, NATO would 
probably accept Finnish and Swedish applications for membership, large portions of their 
populations want to join NATO, and the political leadership in at least one of the two 
countries (Sweden) is likely to change to a pro-NATO party in the next election, in 
addition to persisting Russian aggression, it seems likely that the countries will join 
NATO in the next decade. Additionally, if Russia provoked a crisis in the Baltic region or 
attacked a European Union (EU) or NORDEFCO member, Finland and Sweden would 
almost certainly seek membership in (and protection from) NATO. However, Russia’s 
exact actions are impossible to predict, and Finland and Sweden will not take a decision 
to join the Alliance lightly, so it is not certain that they will eventually become NATO 
Allies. 
While it remains to be seen if Finland and Sweden will seek membership, it 
would greatly benefit the United States if they did. As described in Chapter IV, Finland 
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and Sweden joining the Alliance would greatly strengthen NATO’s ability to deter and 
defend against a Russian attack in the Nordic or Baltic regions, thereby reducing the 
chance that the United States have to deal with a major conflict involving Russia. 
Additionally, Finland and Sweden would be security contributors in the Alliance, 
strengthening NATO’s overall military capabilities and, in turn, the United States’ largest 
and most important military alliance. 
In order to best encourage these two strategically located and heavily involved 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) participants to finally join the Alliance as members, the most 
important thing the United States must do is avoid providing any formal or informal 
security guarantees to Finland or Sweden and continue to make it clear that NATO 
collective defense guarantees apply only to Allies. This will prevent any cultivation of the 
notion that the countries might be able to secure most of the benefits of joining the 
Alliance, including U.S. protection, without committing themselves to protecting other 
NATO Allies or affecting their relations with Moscow. Additionally, the U.S. State 
Department should engage with the Finnish and Swedish governments and encourage 
them to apply for membership in the Alliance. False rumors and misinformation 
regarding what NATO membership would entail are circulating in the public domains of 
these countries that could be countered by encouraging public debates based on the 
government reports that each of these countries has recently sponsored. Finally, the 
United States should encourage the Alliance to continue allowing Finland and Sweden to 
participate in PfP activities and further integrate themselves into the organization’s 
framework, as this will increase their familiarity with the Alliance and accustomize their 
populations to the idea of working closely with NATO. Over time, this close partnership 
will probably make more Finns and Swedes comfortable with abandoning the neutrality 
they were raised to rely on in favor of the NATO protection that Russian aggression 
makes clear they need. 
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